On Participation Games with Complete Information
AbstractWe analyze a class of two-candidate voter participation games under complete information that encompasses as special cases certain public good provision games. We characterize the Nash equilibria of these games as stationary points of a non-linear programming problem, the objective function of which is a Morse function (one that does not admit degenerate critical points) for almost all costs of participation. We use this fact to establish that, outside a closed set of measure zero of participation costs, all equilibria of these games are regular (an alternative to the result of De Sinopoli and Iannantuoni, 2005). One consequence of regularity is that the equilibria of these games are robust to the introduction of (mild) incomplete information. Finally, we establish the existence of monotone Nash equilibria, such that players with higher participation cost abstain with (weakly) higher probability.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy in its series Wallis Working Papers with number WP40.
Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2005
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: University of Rochester, Wallis Institute, Harkness 109B Rochester, New York 14627 U.S.A.
Turnout; Public Goods; Regular Equilibrium; Monotone Equilibrium.;
Other versions of this item:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-11-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2005-11-05 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2005-11-05 (Microeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Francesco Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2005.
"On the generic strategic stability of Nash equilibria if voting is costly,"
Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 477-486, 02.
- De Sinopoli, Francesco & Iannantuoni, Giovanna, . "On the generic strategic stability of nash equilibria if voting is costly," Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid info:hdl:10016/280, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
- Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2002. "On The Generic Strategic Stability Of Nash Equilibria If Voting Is Costly," Economics Working Papers we025620, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
- Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2003. "On the Generic Strategic Stability of Nash Equilibria if Voting is Costly," CEIS Research Paper 41, Tor Vergata University, CEIS.
- Timothy J. Feddersen, 2004. "Rational Choice Theory and the Paradox of Not Voting," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 18(1), pages 99-112, Winter.
- Govindan, Srihari & Reny, Philip J. & Robson, Arthur J., 2003. "A short proof of Harsanyi's purification theorem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 369-374, November.
- Tasos Kalandrakis, 2009.
"Robust rational turnout,"
Springer, vol. 41(2), pages 317-343, November.
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