Abstention in Daylight: Strategic Calculus of Voting in the European Parliament
AbstractAs in large elections, substantialabstention is frequently observed inlegislative assemblies. This paper analyzesroll call votes from the third and fourthlegislatures (1989–1999) of the EuropeanParliament to test predictions from threetypes of theories of abstention: (1)decision-theoretic approach of RationalChoice theory, (2) game-theoretic approachof Rational Choice theory, and (3) theSwing Voter’s Curse theory. The resultsindicate that closeness significantlydecreases the rate of abstention. Thefindings also show that an increase in theprobability of being in the majorityincreases turnout. Overall, findings aresupportive of the decision-theoreticapproach of Rational Choice theory butnot of the game-theoretic approach toabstention or the Swing Voter’s Cursetheory. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 121 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 (October)
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