We study a collective decision-making process in which people interested in an issue may participate, at a cost, in a meeting, and the resulting decision is a compromise among the participants' preferences. We show that the equilibrium number of participants is small and their positions are extreme, and when the compromise is the median, the outcome is likely to be random. The model and its equilibria are consistent with evidence on the procedures and outcomes of U.S. regulatory hearings.
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Volume (Year): 90 (2000) Issue (Month): 4 (September) Pages: 927-943 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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Paper
Martin Osborne & Jeffry Rosenthal & Matthew A. Turner, 1998.
"Meetings with costly participation,"
Working Papers
mturner-98-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Timothy J. Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1995.
"The Swing Voter's Curse,"
Discussion Papers
1064, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
[Downloadable!]
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Casella, Alessandra & Gelman, Andrew & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2003.
"An Experimental Study of Storable Votes,"
Working Papers
1173, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
[Downloadable!]
Alessandra Casella, 2002.
"Storable Votes,"
NBER Working Papers
9189, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Alessandra Casella, 2002.
"Storable votes,"
Discussion Papers
0102-71, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]