On the Membership of Decision-Making Committees
AbstractThe decision of a committee is determined jointly by the voting process it adopts and the composition of its membership. The paper analyses the process through which committee members emerge from the eligible population and traces the consequences of this for the decisions of the committee. It is shown that the equilibrium committee will be composed of representatives from the extremes of the taste distribution. These extremes balance each other and the committee reaches a moderate decision. However, this mutual negation by the extremes is a socially wasteful use of time. Data from the UK House of Lords is used to illustrate these results.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Exeter University, Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 0009.
Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
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VOTING ; DISTRIBUTION ; POPULATION;
Other versions of this item:
- D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
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Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
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by Mainly Macro in Mainly Macro on 2012-12-07 11:16:00
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NajEcon Working Paper Reviews
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