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Individually-Relational Union Membership

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  • Bulkley, G.
  • Myles, G.D.

Abstract

The analysis of the determination of union membership has typically met difficulties with the fact that union membership is not individually rational and free-riding is the dominant strategy. We assume that workers differ in their reservation wages and hence in their preferred choice of contract, so preventing free-riding on the contract choice of others. This implies that joining a union is equivalent to buying a vote on the contract and provides an individual incentive to join the union. An equilibrium trade union membership is characterized in which membership is taken up by those with relatively "extreme" tastes. The union achieves a centralist objective even though no member precisely supports such a view.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Exeter University, Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 0008.

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Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:exe:wpaper:0008

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Postal: Streatham Court, Rennes Drive, Exeter EX4 4PU
Phone: (01392) 263218
Fax: (01392) 263242
Web page: http://business-school.exeter.ac.uk/about/departments/economics/
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Related research

Keywords: WORKERS ; WAGES ; CONTRACTS;

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References

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  1. Naylor, Robin, 1989. "Strikes, Free Riders, and Social Customs," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 104(4), pages 771-85, November.
  2. Myles, G.D. & Naylor, R.A., 1990. "Do Union Reduce Discrimination? A Model Of Nash Bargaining Between A Union And An Employeur With Discriminatory Tastes," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 366, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  3. Moreton, David R., 1998. "An open shop trade union model of wages, effort and membership," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 511-527, August.
  4. Vannetelbosch, Vincent J., 1997. "Wage bargaining with incomplete information in an unionized Cournot oligopoly," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 353-374, May.
  5. Bulkley, G. & Myles, G.D. & Pearson, B.R., 2000. "On the Membership of Decision-Making Committees," Discussion Papers 0009, Exeter University, Department of Economics.
  6. repec:fth:exetec:00/09 is not listed on IDEAS
  7. Bulkley, George & Myles, Gareth D., 1997. "Bargaining over effort," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 375-384, May.
  8. Naylor, Robin & Cripps, Martin, 1993. "An economic theory of the open shop trade union," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 37(8), pages 1599-1620, December.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Schnabel, Claus & Wagner, Joachim, 2003. "Trade Union Membership in Eastern and Western Germany: Convergence or Divergence?," IZA Discussion Papers 707, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  2. Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2005. "Meetings with Costly Participation: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 1349-1350, September.
  3. Schnabel, Claus & Wagner, Joachim, 2003. "Determinants of Trade Union Membership in Western Germany: Evidence from Micro Data, 1980-2000," IZA Discussion Papers 708, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  4. Rupayan Pal, 2008. "Estimating the probability of trade union membership in India: Impact of Communist parties, personal attributes and industrial characteristics," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2008-015, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.
  5. Torberg Falch & Bjarne Strøm, 2004. "Wage Bargaining and Monopsony," Working Paper Series 4304, Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology.
  6. Rupayan Pal, 2008. "Estimating the Probability of Trade Union Membership in India: Impact of Communist Parties, Personal Attributes and Industrial Characteristics," Working Papers id:1669, eSocialSciences.
  7. Gábor R., István, 2004. "Tőkésvállalat vis-à-vis szakszervezet, versus termelőszövetkezet. Peripatetikus tanmese az intézményi racionalitás/diverzitás és a piaci önszabályozás ellentmondásos viszonyáról
    [C
    ," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(7), pages 740-751.
  8. Schnabel, Claus & Wagner, Joachim, 2005. "Determinants of Union Membership in 18 EU Countries : Evidence from Micro Data, 2002/03," Discussion Papers 31, Friedrich-Alexander-University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Chair of Labour and Regional Economics.
  9. Schnabel, Claus, 2002. "Determinants of trade union membership," Discussion Papers 15, Friedrich-Alexander-University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Chair of Labour and Regional Economics.

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