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Meetings with Costly Participation: An Empirical Analysis

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  • Matthew Turner
  • Quinn Weninger

Abstract

Using data from the Mid-Atlantic surf clam and ocean quahog fishery, we find that firms with a preference for extreme, rather than moderate, policies are much more likely to participate in public meetings where regulation is determined. We also find that participation rates are higher for larger, closer, and more influential firms. These results: (1) improve our understanding of a very common institution for resource allocation, "meetings with costly participation", (2) they refine our intuition about regulatory capture, (3) they provide broad confirmation of the recent theoretical literature predicting that polarization and bipartisanship should emerge under a variety of democratic institutions, and finally, (4) they may help to explain management problems in U.S. fisheries. Copyright 2005, Wiley-Blackwell.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal The Review of Economic Studies.

Volume (Year): 72 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 247-268

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Handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:72:y:2005:i:1:p:247-268

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Cited by:
  1. Weninger, Quinn, 2004. "Economic Benefits of Management Reform in the Gulf of Mexico Grouper Fishery: A Semi-Parametric Analysis," Staff General Research Papers, Iowa State University, Department of Economics 11178, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  2. Takanori Adachi, 2004. "Costly participation in voting and equilibrium abstention: a uniqueness result," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(2), pages 1-5.
  3. Leah Brooks & Justin Phillips & Maxim Sinitsyn, 2011. "The Cabals of a Few or the Confusion of a Multitude: The Institutional Trade-Off between Representation and Governance," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 3(1), pages 1-24, February.
  4. Squires, Dale & Jeon, Yongil & Grafton, R. Quentin & Kirkley, James, 2010. "Controlling excess capacity in common-pool resource industries: the transition from input to output controls," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 54(3), September.
  5. Tilman Borgers, 2004. "Costly Voting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 94(1), pages 57-66, March.
  6. Saiz, Albert, 2011. "The median voter didn't show up: Costly meetings and insider rents," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 41(5), pages 415-425, September.
  7. R. Quentin Grafton & Ragnar Arnason & Trond Bjorndal & David Campbell & Harry F. Campbell & Colin W. Clark & Robin Connor & Diane P. Dupont & Rognvaldur Hannesson & Ray Hilborn & James E. Kirkley & To, 2005. "Incentive-based approaches to sustainable fisheries (now replaced by EEN0508)," Economics and Environment Network Working Papers, Australian National University, Economics and Environment Network 0501, Australian National University, Economics and Environment Network.
  8. Smith, Martin D. & Zhang, Junjie & Coleman, Felicia C., 2008. "Econometric modeling of fisheries with complex life histories: Avoiding biological management failures," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 265-280, May.
  9. John Lynham, 2012. "How Have Catch Shares Been Allocated?," Working Papers, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics 201219, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.

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