On the Membership of Decision-Making Committees
AbstractThe decision of a committee is determined jointly by the voting process it adopts and the composition of its membership. The paper analyses the process through which committee members emerge from the eligible population and traces the consequences of this for the decisions of the committee. It is shown that the equilibrium committee will be composed of representatives from the extremes of the taste distribution. These extremes balance each other and the committee reaches a moderate decision. However, this mutual negation by the extremes is a socially wasteful use of time. Data from the UK House of Lords is used to illustrate these results. Copyright 2001 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 106 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (January)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
Other versions of this item:
- D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
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Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
- Delegating to the wrong people: the strange case of interviewing undergraduate candidates at Oxford
by Mainly Macro in Mainly Macro on 2012-12-07 11:16:00
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- Chakravarty, Surajeet & Kaplan, Todd R & Myles, Gareth, 2010.
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21372, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Ronald Bosman & Philipp Maier & Vijollca Sadiraj & Frans van Winden, 2004. "Let Me Vote! An Experimental Study of the Effects of Vote Rotation in Committees," DNB Working Papers 023, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
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