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Meetings with costly participation: An empirical

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  • Quinn Weninger
  • Matthew tunrer

Abstract

Using data from the Mid-Atlantic surf clam and ocean quahog fishery, we find that firms with a preference for extreme, rather than moderate, policies are much more likely to participate in public meetings where regulation is determined. We also find that participation rates are higher for larger, closer, and more influential firms. These results; (1) improve our understanding of a very common institution for resource allocation, 'meetings with costly participation', (2) they refine our intuition about regulatory capture, (3) they provide broad confirmation of the recent theoretical literature predicting that polarization and bipartisanship should emerge under a variety of democratic institutions, and finally, (4) they may help to explain management problems in US fisheries

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Econometric Society in its series Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings with number 411.

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Date of creation: 11 Aug 2004
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Handle: RePEc:ecm:nasm04:411

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Keywords: meetings; committees; regulation; fisheries.;

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  1. Hao Li & Sherwin Rosen & Wing Suen, 2001. "Conflicts and Common Interests in Committees," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1478-1497, December.
  2. Ando, Amy Whritenour, 1999. "Waiting to Be Protected under the Endangered Species Act: The Political Economy of Regulatory Delay," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(1), pages 29-60, April.
  3. Alesina, Alberto & Tabellini, Guido, 1990. "A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(3), pages 403-14, July.
  4. Bulkley, G. & Myles, G.D. & Pearson, B.R., 2000. "On the Membership of Decision-Making Committees," Discussion Papers, Exeter University, Department of Economics 0009, Exeter University, Department of Economics.
  5. Cropper, Maureen L. & William N. Evans & Stephen J. Berard & Maria M. Ducla-Soares & Paul R. Portney, 1992. "The Determinants of Pesticide Regulation: A Statistical Analysis of EPA Decision Making," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(1), pages 175-97, February.
  6. Murphy, Kevin M & Topel, Robert H, 2002. "Estimation and Inference in Two-Step Econometric Models," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, American Statistical Association, American Statistical Association, vol. 20(1), pages 88-97, January.
  7. Abhijit Banerjee & Rohini Somanathan, 2001. "A Simple Model Of Voice," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 116(1), pages 189-227, February.
  8. Colin M. Campbell, 1999. "Large Electorates and Decisive Minorities," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(6), pages 1199-1217, December.
  9. Johnson, Ronald N & Libecap, Gary D, 1982. "Contracting Problems and Regulation: The Case of the Fishery," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 1005-22, December.
  10. Jeffrey S. Rosenthal & Martin J. Osborne & Matthew A. Turner, 2000. "Meetings with Costly Participation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 927-943, September.
  11. Tilman Börgers, 2001. "Costly Voting," Levine's Working Paper Archive 625018000000000232, David K. Levine.
  12. Bruno Biais & Enrico Perotti, 2002. "Machiavellian Privatization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 92(1), pages 240-258, March.
  13. Timothy J. Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1995. "The Swing Voter's Curse," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1064, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  14. Chamberlain, Gary, 1980. "Analysis of Covariance with Qualitative Data," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(1), pages 225-38, January.
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