Meetings with costly participation
AbstractWe study a collective decision-making process in which people who are interested in an issue are invited to attend a meeting, and the policy chosen is a compromise among the preferences of those who show up. We show that in an equilibrium the number of attendees is small and their positions are extreme; in a wide range of circumstances the outcome is random. These characteristics of an equilibrium are consistent with evidence on the outcome of hearings on US regulatory policy.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Toronto, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number mturner-98-02.
Length: 41 pages
Date of creation: 11 May 1998
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Other versions of this item:
- Jeffrey S. Rosenthal & Martin J. Osborne & Matthew A. Turner, 2000. "Meetings with Costly Participation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 927-943, September.
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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