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Meetings with costly participation Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Martin Osborne
Jeffry Rosenthal
Matthew A. Turner
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We study a collective decision-making process in which people who are interested in an issue are invited to attend a meeting, and the policy chosen is a compromise among the preferences of those who show up. We show that in an equilibrium the number of attendees is small and their positions are extreme; in a wide range of circumstances the outcome is random. These characteristics of an equilibrium are consistent with evidence on the outcome of hearings on US regulatory policy.
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Paper provided by University of Toronto, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number
mturner-98-02.
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Length: 41 pages
Date of creation: 11 May 1998Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:tor:tecipa:mturner-98-02Contact details of provider: Postal: 150 St. George Street, Toronto, Ontario Phone: (416) 978-5283 Fax: (416) 978-6713
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Find related papers by JEL classification: D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports :
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Feddersen, Timothy J & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 1996.
"The Swing Voter's Curse ,"
American Economic Review ,
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references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
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[Downloadable!] Casella, Alessandra & Gelman, Andrew & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2006.
"An experimental study of storable votes ,"
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[Downloadable!] (restricted) Matthew A. Turner & Quinn Weninger, 2001.
"Meetings with Costly Participation: An Empirical Investigation ,"
Working Papers
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Taylor, Curtis & Yildirim, Huseyin, 2005.
"Public Information and Electoral Bias ,"
Working Papers
05-11, Duke University, Department of Economics.
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Alessandra Casella, 2002.
"Storable Votes ,"
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9189, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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Other versions:
Alessandra Casella, 2002.
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[Downloadable!] Casella, Alessandra, 2002.
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[Downloadable!] (restricted) Casella, Alessandra, 2005.
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Quinn Weninger & Matthew tunrer, 2004.
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Other versions: Kunal Sengupta & Murali Agastya, 2004.
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