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Martin J. Osborne

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Personal Details

First Name: Martin
Middle Name: J.
Last Name: Osborne
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RePEc Short-ID: pos1

Email:
Homepage: http://www.economics.utoronto.ca/osborne/index.html
Postal Address: Department of Economics 150 St. George Street University of Toronto Toronto M5S 3G7 CANADA
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Affiliation

Works


Download all references for this author: available formats: HTML (with abstracts), plain text (with abstracts), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF

Working papers

  1. Martin J Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2009. "A Course in Game Theory," Levine's Bibliography 814577000000000225, UCLA Department of Economics.
  2. Martin J. Osborne & Matthew A. Turner, 2007. "Cost benefit analysis vs. referenda," Working Papers tecipa-286, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  3. Martin J. Osborne & Rabee Tourky, 2007. "Party formation in single-issue politics [revised]," Working Papers tecipa-296, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  4. Martin J. Osborne, 2006. "Strategic and extensive games," Working Papers tecipa-231, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  5. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "Bargaining and Markets," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics.
  6. Martin J. Osborne & Rabee Tourky, 2005. "Party formation in single-issue politics," Working Papers tecipa-174, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  7. Martin J. Osborne & Rabee Tourky, 2002. "Party Formation Incollective Decision-Making," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 844, The University of Melbourne.
  8. Martin Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2002. "Sampling Equilibrium with an Application to Strategic Voting," Levine's Working Paper Archive 506439000000000037, David K. Levine.
  9. Martin Osborne & Jeffry Rosenthal & Matthew A. Turner, 1998. "Meetings with costly participation," Working Papers mturner-98-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  10. Osborne, M-J & Rubinstein, A, 1997. "Games with Procedurally Rational Players," Papers 4-97, Tel Aviv.
  11. Martin J. Osborne & Al Slivinksi, 1995. "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates," Department of Economics Working Papers 1995-01, McMaster University.
  12. Martin J. Osborne, 1992. "Candidate Positioning and Entry in a Political Competition," Department of Economics Working Papers 1992-02, McMaster University.
  13. Binmore, K. & Osborne, M.J. & Rubinstein, A., 1989. "Noncooperative Models Of Bargaining," Papers 89-26, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
  14. Martin J Osborne & Carolyn Pitchik, 1985. "Equilibrium in Hotelling's Model of Spatial Competition," Department of Economics Working Papers 1985-02, McMaster University.
  15. Osborne, Martin J. & Pitchik, Carolyn, 1983. "Cartels, Profits, and Excess Capacity," Working Papers 83-09, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  16. Martin J. Osborne & Carolyn Pitchik, 1983. "Profit-Sharing in a Collusive Industry," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 668, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  17. Osborne, Martin J. & Pitchik, Carolyn, 1983. "Price Competition in a Capacity-Constrained Duopoly," Working Papers 83-08, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  18. Martin J. Osborne & Carolyn Pitchik, 1982. "Equilibria for a Three-Person Location Problem," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 628, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  19. Osborne, Martin J. & Pitchik, Carolyn, 1982. "Are Large Firms More Powerful Than Small Ones?," Working Papers 82-07, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.

Articles

  1. Martin J. Osborne & Matthew A. Turner, 2010. "Cost Benefit Analyses versus Referenda," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 118(1), pages 156-187, 02.
  2. Martin J. Osborne & Rabee Tourky, 2008. "Party Formation in Single-Issue Politics," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(5), pages 974-1005, 09.
  3. Martin J. Osborne & Jeffrey S. Rosenthal & Matthew A. Turner, 2005. "Meetings with Costly Participation: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 1351-1354, September.
  4. Osborne, Martin J. & Rubinstein, Ariel, 2003. "Sampling equilibrium, with an application to strategic voting," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 434-441, November.
  5. Martin J. Osborne & Jeffrey S. Rosenthal & Matthew A. Turner, 2000. "Meetings with Costly Participation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 927-943, September.
  6. Osborne, Martin J., 2000. "Entry-deterring policy differentiation by electoral candidates," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 41-62, July.
  7. Osborne, Martin J & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1998. "Games with Procedurally Rational Players," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 834-47, September.
  8. Osborne, Martin J & Slivinski, Al, 1996. "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 111(1), pages 65-96, February.
  9. Martin J. Osborne, 1995. "Spatial Models of Political Competition under Plurality Rule: A Survey of Some Explanations of the Number of Candidates and the Positions They Take," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 28(2), pages 261-301, May.
  10. Osborne Martin J., 1993. "Candidate Positioning and Entry in a Political Competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 133-151, January.
  11. Osborne, Martin J., 1990. "Signaling, forward induction, and stability in finitely repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 22-36, February.
  12. Osborne, Martin J & Pitchik, Carolyn, 1987. "Equilibrium in Hotelling's Model of Spatial Competition," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(4), pages 911-22, July.
  13. Osborne, Martin J & Pitchik, Carolyn, 1987. "Cartels, Profits and Excess Capacity," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 28(2), pages 413-28, June.
  14. Osborne, Martin J. & Pitchik, Carolyn, 1986. "Price competition in a capacity-constrained duopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 238-260, April.
  15. Osborne, Martin J & Pitchik, Carolyn, 1986. "The Nature of Equilibrium in a Location Model," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 27(1), pages 223-37, February.
  16. Osborne, Martin J, 1984. "Capitalist-Worker Conflict and Involuntary Unemployment," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(1), pages 111-27, January.
  17. Osborne, Martin J., 1984. "Why do some goods bear higher taxes than others?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 301-316, April.
  18. Osborne, Martin J. & Pitchik, Carolyn, 1983. "Profit-sharing in a collusive industry," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 59-74, June.

Chapters

  1. Binmore, Ken & Osborne, Martin J. & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1992. "Noncooperative models of bargaining," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 7, pages 179-225 Elsevier.

Books

  1. Osborne, Martin J., 2009. "Introduction to Game Theory: International Edition," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195322484, December.
  2. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401.

Editor

  1. Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.

NEP Fields

8 papers by this author were announced in NEP, and specifically in the following field reports (number of papers):
  1. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (5) 2004-06-07 2005-04-09 2007-04-21 2007-08-08 2010-12-18 Author is listed
  2. NEP-EXP: Experimental Economics (1) 2009-05-30
  3. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (3) 2005-02-27 2006-05-06 2009-05-30 Author is listed
  4. NEP-HPE: History & Philosophy of Economics (1) 2006-05-06
  5. NEP-IND: Industrial Organization (1) 2005-02-27
  6. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (3) 2005-02-27 2006-05-06 2009-05-30 Author is listed
  7. NEP-NET: Network Economics (1) 2010-12-18
  8. NEP-PBE: Public Economics (1) 2007-04-21
  9. NEP-POL: Positive Political Economics (2) 2005-04-09 2007-08-08 Author is listed
  10. NEP-UPT: Utility Models & Prospect Theory (1) 2010-12-18

Statistics

This author is among the top 5% authors according to these criteria:
  1. Average Rank Score
  2. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor
  3. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor
  4. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors
  5. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors
  6. Number of Citations
  7. Number of Citations, Discounted by Citation Age
  8. Number of Citations, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor
  9. Number of Citations, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor, Discounted by Citation Age
  10. Number of Citations, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor
  11. Number of Citations, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor, Discounted by Citation Age
  12. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors
  13. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors, Discounted by Citation Age
  14. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors
  15. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors, Discounted by Citation Age
  16. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors
  17. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors, Discounted by Citation Age
  18. Number of Registered Citing Authors
  19. Number of Registered Citing Authors, Weighted by Rank (Max. 1 per Author)
  20. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor
  21. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor
  22. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors
  23. Wu-Index

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