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Information about:
Martin J. Osborne

Personal Details | Affiliation | Works
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Personal Details

First Name: Martin
Middle Name: J.
Last Name: Osborne
Suffix:

RePEc Short-ID: pos1

Email:
Homepage: http://www.economics.utoronto.ca/osborne/index.html
Postal Address: Department of Economics 150 St. George Street University of Toronto Toronto M5S 3G7 CANADA
Phone:

Affiliation

(in no particular order)

Lists

This author is among the top 5% authors according to these criteria:
  1. Average Rank Score
  2. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor
  3. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors
  4. Number of Citations
  5. Number of Citations, Discounted by Citation Age
  6. Number of Citations, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor
  7. Number of Citations, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor, Discounted by Citation Age
  8. Number of Citations, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor
  9. Number of Citations, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor, Discounted by Citation Age
  10. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors
  11. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors, Discounted by Citation Age
  12. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors
  13. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors, Discounted by Citation Age
  14. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors
  15. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors, Discounted by Citation Age
  16. Number of Registered Citing Authors
  17. Number of Registered Citing Authors, Weighted by Rank (Max. 1 per Author)
  18. Number of Downloads through RePEc Services over the past 12 months
  19. Number of Downloads through RePEc Services over the past 12 months, Weighted by Number of Authors
  20. Wu-Index

Works

| Working papers | Articles | Chapters | Books | Editor | Access and download statistics | Citations (if any)| NEP Fields |
Download all references for this author: available formats: HTML (with abstracts), plain text (with abstracts), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF

Working papers

  1. Martin J Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2009. "A Course in Game Theory," Levine's Bibliography 814577000000000225, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Published as:

  2. Martin J. Osborne & Matthew A. Turner, 2007. "Cost benefit analysis vs. referenda," Working Papers tecipa-286, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

  3. Martin J. Osborne & Rabee Tourky, 2007. "Party formation in single-issue politics [revised]," Working Papers tecipa-296, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

  4. Martin J. Osborne, 2006. "Strategic and extensive games," Working Papers tecipa-231, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

  5. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "Bargaining and Markets," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

  6. Martin J. Osborne & Rabee Tourky, 2005. "Party formation in single-issue politics," Working Papers tecipa-174, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Published as:

  7. Martin J Osborne & Rabee Tourky, 2002. "Party formation in collective decision-making," Levine's Bibliography 506439000000000050, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:

  8. Martin Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2002. "A Sampling Equilibrium with an Application to Strategic Voting," Levine's Bibliography 506439000000000037, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Published as:

  9. Martin Osborne & Jeffry Rosenthal & Matthew A. Turner, 1998. "Meetings with costly participation," Working Papers mturner-98-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Osborne, M-J & Rubinstein, A, 1997. "Games with Procedurally Rational Players," Papers 4-97, Tel Aviv.
    Other versions:
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  11. Martin J. Osborne & Al Slivinksi, 1995. "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates," Department of Economics Working Papers 1995-01, McMaster University. [Downloadable!]
    Published as:

  12. Martin J. Osborne, 1992. "Candidate Positioning and Entry in a Political Competition," Department of Economics Working Papers 1992-02, McMaster University. [Downloadable!]
    Published as:

  13. Binmore, K. & Osborne, M.J. & Rubinstein, A., 1989. "Noncooperative Models Of Bargaining," Papers 89-26, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
    Published as:

  14. Martin J Osborne & Carolyn Pitchik, 1985. "Equilibrium in Hotelling's Model of Spatial Competition," Department of Economics Working Papers 1985-02, McMaster University. [Downloadable!]
    Published as:

  15. Osborne, Martin J. & Pitchik, Carolyn, 1983. "Cartels, Profits, and Excess Capacity," Working Papers 83-09, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
    Published as:

  16. Martin J. Osborne & Carolyn Pitchik, 1983. "Profit-Sharing in a Collusive Industry," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 668, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    Published as:

  17. Osborne, Martin J. & Pitchik, Carolyn, 1983. "Price Competition in a Capacity-Constrained Duopoly," Working Papers 83-08, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
    Published as:

  18. Martin J. Osborne & Carolyn Pitchik, 1982. "Equilibria for a Three-Person Location Problem," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 628, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
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  19. Osborne, Martin J. & Pitchik, Carolyn, 1982. "Are Large Firms More Powerful Than Small Ones?," Working Papers 82-07, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]

Articles

  1. Martin J. Osborne & Rabee Tourky, 2008. "Party Formation in Single-Issue Politics," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(5), pages 974-1005, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

  2. Martin J. Osborne & Jeffrey S. Rosenthal & Matthew A. Turner, 2005. "Meetings with Costly Participation: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 1351-1354, September. [Downloadable!]

  3. Osborne, Martin J. & Rubinstein, Ariel, 2003. "Sampling equilibrium, with an application to strategic voting," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 434-441, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

  4. Martin J. Osborne & Jeffrey S. Rosenthal & Matthew A. Turner, 2000. "Meetings with Costly Participation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 927-943, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

  5. Osborne, Martin J., 2000. "Entry-deterring policy differentiation by electoral candidates," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 41-62, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  6. Osborne, Martin J & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1998. "Games with Procedurally Rational Players," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 834-47, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

  7. Osborne, Martin J & Slivinski, Al, 1996. "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 111(1), pages 65-96, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

  8. Martin J. Osborne, 1995. "Spatial Models of Political Competition under Plurality Rule: A Survey of Some Explanations of the Number of Candidates and the Positions They Take," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 28(2), pages 261-301, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  9. Osborne Martin J., 1993. "Candidate Positioning and Entry in a Political Competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 133-151, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

  10. Osborne, Martin J., 1990. "Signaling, forward induction, and stability in finitely repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 22-36, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  11. Osborne, Martin J & Pitchik, Carolyn, 1987. "Equilibrium in Hotelling's Model of Spatial Competition," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(4), pages 911-22, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

  12. Osborne, Martin J & Pitchik, Carolyn, 1987. "Cartels, Profits and Excess Capacity," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 28(2), pages 413-28, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

  13. Osborne, Martin J. & Pitchik, Carolyn, 1986. "Price competition in a capacity-constrained duopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 238-260, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

  14. Osborne, Martin J & Pitchik, Carolyn, 1986. "The Nature of Equilibrium in a Location Model," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 27(1), pages 223-37, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  15. Osborne, Martin J, 1984. "Capitalist-Worker Conflict and Involuntary Unemployment," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 51(1), pages 111-27, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  16. Osborne, Martin J., 1984. "Why do some goods bear higher taxes than others?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 301-316, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  17. Osborne, Martin J. & Pitchik, Carolyn, 1983. "Profit-sharing in a collusive industry," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 59-74, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

Chapters

  1. Binmore, Ken & Osborne, Martin J. & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1992. "Noncooperative models of bargaining," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 7, pages 179-225 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Books

  1. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401.
    Other versions:

Editor

  1. Theoretical Economics, Society for Economic Theory.

NEP Fields

8 papers by this author were announced in NEP, and specifically in the following field reports (number of papers):
  1. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (5) 2002-10-23 2004-06-07 2005-04-09 2007-04-21 2007-08-08 Author is listed
  2. NEP-EXP: Experimental Economics (1) 2009-05-30
  3. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (3) 2005-02-27 2006-05-06 2009-05-30 Author is listed
  4. NEP-HPE: History & Philosophy of Economics (1) 2006-05-06
  5. NEP-IND: Industrial Organization (1) 2005-02-27
  6. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (3) 2005-02-27 2006-05-06 2009-05-30 Author is listed
  7. NEP-PBE: Public Economics (1) 2007-04-21
  8. NEP-POL: Positive Political Economics (2) 2005-04-09 2007-08-08 Author is listed
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-11.

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