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Extreme donors and policy convergence

Author

Listed:
  • Daisuke Hirata

    (Hitotsubashi University)

  • Yuichiro Kamada

    (University of California, Berkeley)

Abstract

We consider a two-candidate election model with campaign contributions. In the first stage of the game, each of the two candidates chooses a policy position. In the second stage, each of n donors chooses the amount of contribution to each candidate. The winning probability of each candidate depends on the total amount of contributions that she raises from the donors. In any equilibrium of our model, only extreme donors contribute at any subgame, and the policies converge on the unique equilibrium path. Our results suggest that extreme donors and their contributions do not necessarily cause policies to diverge.

Suggested Citation

  • Daisuke Hirata & Yuichiro Kamada, 2020. "Extreme donors and policy convergence," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 55(1), pages 149-176, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:55:y:2020:i:1:d:10.1007_s00355-019-01234-1
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-019-01234-1
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    Cited by:

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