Strategic Campaigns and Redistributive Politics
AbstractThe article investigates strategic, informative campaigning by two parties when politics concern redistribution. Voters are uncertain about whether parties favour special groups. Parties will target campaigns on groups where most votes are gained by informing about policies. In equilibrium, campaigning will be most intensive in groups where the uncertainty is largest and where voters are most mobile, most likely to vote, most receptive to campaigns and relatively uninformed initially. These groups will become more informed about policy. Parties will therefore gain more votes by treating these groups well so these groups will gain from strategic campaigning. Welfare effects are assessed. Copyright 2007 The Author(s). Journal compilation Royal Economic Society 2007.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Royal Economic Society in its journal The Economic Journal.
Volume (Year): 117 (2007)
Issue (Month): 522 (07)
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Office of the Secretary-General, School of Economics and Finance, University of St. Andrews, St. Andrews, Fife, KY16 9AL, UK
Phone: +44 1334 462479
Web page: http://www.res.org.uk/
More information through EDIRC
Other versions of this item:
- Christian Schultz, 2003. "Strategic Campaigns and Redistributive Politics," EPRU Working Paper Series 03-03, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Christian Schultz, 2003. "Strategic Campaigns and Redistributive Politics," CESifo Working Paper Series 858, CESifo Group Munich.
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Potters, J.J.M. & Sloof, R. & Winden, F.A.A.M. van, 1997.
"Campaign expenditures, contributions and direct endorsements. The strategic use of information and money to influence voter behaviour,"
Open Access publications from Tilburg University
urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-73909, Tilburg University.
- Potters, Jan & Sloof, Randolph & van Winden, Frans, 1997. "Campaign expenditures, contributions and direct endorsements: The strategic use of information and money to influence voter behavior," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 1-31, February.
- Potters, J.J.M. & Sloof, R. & Winden, F.A.A.M. van, 1997. "Campaign Expenditures, Contributions and Direct Endorsements: The Strategic Use of Information and Money to Influence Voter Behavior," Discussion Paper 1997-27, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Timothy Besley & Robin Burgess, 2002.
"The Political Economy Of Government Responsiveness: Theory And Evidence From India,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 117(4), pages 1415-1451, November.
- Besley, Timothy J. & Burgess, Robin, 2001. "The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India," CEPR Discussion Papers 2721, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Timothy Besley & Robin Burgess, 2000. "The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India," STICERD - Development Economics Papers - From 2008 this series has been superseded by Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers 28, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Christian Schultz & Ignacio Ortuno-OrtÍn, 2000.
"Public Funding of Political Parties,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
368, CESifo Group Munich.
- Christian Schultz & Ignacio Ortuño Ortín, 2000. "Public Funding Of Political Parties," Working Papers. Serie AD 2000-27, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Ignacio Ortuno Ortin & Christian Schultz, 2000. "Public Funding of Political Parties," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0735, Econometric Society.
- Schultz, Christian, 2002. "Policy biases with voters' uncertainty about the economy and the government," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 487-506, March.
- Stephen Coate, 2004.
"Political Competition with Campaign Contributions and Informative Advertising,"
Journal of the European Economic Association,
MIT Press, vol. 2(5), pages 772-804, 09.
- Stephen Coate, 2001. "Political Competition with Campaign Contributions and Informative Advertising," NBER Working Papers 8693, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Dixit, Avinash K & Londregan, John, 1994. "The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Politics," CEPR Discussion Papers 1054, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Butters, Gerard R, 1977. "Equilibrium Distributions of Sales and Advertising Prices," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(3), pages 465-91, October.
- Grossman, Gene M & Shapiro, Carl, 1984. "Informative Advertising with Differentiated Products," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(1), pages 63-81, January.
- Dahlberg, Matz & Johansson, Eva, 1999.
"On the Vote Purchasing Behavior of Incumbent Governments,"
Working Paper Series
1999:24, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
- Dahlberg, M. & Johansson, E., 1999. "On the Vote Purchasing Behavior of Incumbent Governments," Papers 1999:24, Uppsala - Working Paper Series.
- Donald Wittman, 2008. "Targeted political advertising and strategic behavior by uninformed voters," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 87-100, January.
- Ignacio Ortuño Ortín & Christian Schultz, 2012. "Public funding of political parties when campaigns are informative Abstract: The paper considers public funding of political parties when some voters are poorly informed about parties? candidates and ," EPRU Working Paper Series 2012-05, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Panu Poutvaara & Tuomas Takalo, 2004.
- Kovenock, Dan & Roberson, Brian, 2011.
"Non-partisan ‘get-out-the-vote’ efforts and policy outcomes,"
European Journal of Political Economy,
Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 728-739.
- Kovenock, Dan & Roberson, Brian, 2009. "Non-partisan 'Get-out-the-vote' efforts and policy outcomes," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2009-07, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
- Dan Kovenock J. & Brian Roberson, 2009. "Non-Partisan 'Get-Out-the-Vote' Efforts and Policy Outcomes," CESifo Working Paper Series 2815, CESifo Group Munich.
- Hans Gersbach, 2011.
"Campaigns, Political Mobility, and Communication,"
CER-ETH Economics working paper series
11/143, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
- Helios Herrera & David K Levine & Cesar Martinelli, 2007.
"Policy Platforms, Campaign Spending and Voter Participation,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
618897000000000935, David K. Levine.
- Herrera, Helios & Levine, David K. & Martinelli, César, 2008. "Policy platforms, campaign spending and voter participation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(3-4), pages 501-513, April.
- Helios Herrera & David K. Levine & Cesar Martinelli, 2005. "Policy Platforms, Campaign Spending and Voter Participation," Working Papers 0503, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
- Zacharias Maniadis, 2008. "Essays in Aggregate Information, The Media and Special Interests," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002258, David K. Levine.
- Stephen Coate, 2004. "Pareto-Improving Campaign Finance Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(3), pages 628-655, June.
- Daniel Houser & Thomas Stratmann, 2006.
"Selling Favors in the Lab: Experiments on Campaign Finance Reform,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
1727, CESifo Group Munich.
- Daniel Houser & Thomas Stratmann, 2008. "Selling favors in the lab: experiments on campaign finance reform," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 136(1), pages 215-239, July.
- Elena Panova, 2007. "Congruence Among Voters and Contributions to Political Campaigns," Cahiers de recherche 0722, CIRPEE.
- Jenny De Freitas, 2009. "Political support for the private system to finance political parties," DEA Working Papers 35, Universitat de les Illes Balears, Departament d'Economía Aplicada.
- Daniel Houser & Sandra Ludwig & Thomas Stratmann, 2009. "Does Deceptive Advertising Reduce Political Participation? Theory and Evidence," Working Papers 1011, George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science.
- Filippo Gregorini & Filippo Pavesi, 2011. "Do Campaign Finance Policies Really Improve Voters' Welfare?," Working Papers 209, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Apr 2011.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.