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Leadership and conflict

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  • Hamlin, Alan
  • Jennings, Colin

Abstract

We model the choice of leaders of groups within society, where leaders influence both the mode of interaction between groups (either peaceful compromise or costly conflict) and the outcome of these interactions. Group members may choose leaders strategically/instrumentally or they may choose leaders expressively. We characterize the equilibria of the instrumental choice model and also argue that leadership elections may overemphasise the role of expressive considerations in the choice of leader, and that this may result in increased conflict between groups.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.

Volume (Year): 64 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (September)
Pages: 49-68

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:64:y:2007:i:1:p:49-68

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo

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  1. Jack Hirshleifer, 1995. "Theorizing About Conflict," UCLA Economics Working Papers 727, UCLA Department of Economics.
  2. Matthew Rabin., 1992. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," Economics Working Papers 92-199, University of California at Berkeley.
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  7. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1995. "Theorizing about conflict," Handbook of Defense Economics, in: Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler (ed.), Handbook of Defense Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 7, pages 165-189 Elsevier.
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  14. Jean-Robert Tyran, 2002. "Voting when Money and Morals Conflict - An Experimental Test of Expressive Voting," University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2002 2002-07, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen.
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  16. Blamey, Russell K., 1998. "Decisiveness, attitude expression and symbolic responses in contingent valuation surveys," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 577-601, March.
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  18. Kaufman, Bruce E., 1999. "Emotional arousal as a source of bounded rationality," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 135-144, February.
  19. Hamlin, Alan & Hjortlund, Michael, 2000. " Proportional Representation with Citizen Candidates," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(3-4), pages 205-30, June.
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  24. McGann, A J & Grofman, Bernard & Koetzle, W, 2002. " Why Party Leaders Are More Extreme Than Their Members: Modeling Sequential Elimination Elections in the U.S. House of Representatives," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 113(3-4), pages 337-56, December.
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RePEc Biblio mentions

As found on the RePEc Biblio, the curated bibliography for Economics:
  1. > Schools of Economic Thought, Epistemology of Economics > Heterodox Approaches > Thermoeconomics > Bifurcations of the entropy law
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Cited by:
  1. Colin Jennings & Hein Roelfsema, 2008. "Civil Conflict, Federalism and Strategic Delegation of Leadership," Working Papers 0803, University of Strathclyde Business School, Department of Economics.
  2. Colin Jennings, 2008. "Intra-Group Competition and Inter-Group Conflict: An Application to Northern Ireland," Working Papers 0809, University of Strathclyde Business School, Department of Economics.
  3. repec:str:wpaper:0001 is not listed on IDEAS
  4. Stefan Brandauer & Florian Englmaier, 2006. "A Model of Strategic Delegation in Contests between Groups," CESifo Working Paper Series 1654, CESifo Group Munich.
  5. C. Jennings & H.J. Roelfsema, 2004. "Conspicuous Public Goods and Leadership Selection," Working Papers 04-10, Utrecht School of Economics.

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