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Federalism with Bicameralism

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  • Lisa Grazzini

    ()
    (DISEI, Università degli studi di Firenze)

  • Alessandro Petretto

    ()
    (DISEI, Università degli studi di Firenze)

Abstract

We analyse horizontal and vertical fiscal externalities in a federal country with a bicameral national system. We show under which conditions, at equilibrium, the two chambers agree or disagree on the choice of a national tax rate.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa in its series Working Papers - Economics with number wp2013_01.rdf.

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Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: 2013
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Handle: RePEc:frz:wpaper:wp2013_01.rdf

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Keywords: Fiscal federalism; Median voter; Bicameralism.;

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References

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  12. Lisa Grazzini & Alessandro Petretto, 2007. "Voting on Devolution in a Federal Country with a Bicameral National System," Working Papers - Economics, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa wp2007_09, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa.
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