Rationalising â€˜'Irrational'' Support for Political Violence
AbstractThis paper provides a rationale for group support for political violence when violence does not provide a material beneÃ‚â€¦fit. A theory of fairness is adopted to demonstrate that although group violence may not be the equilibrium of a material game it may be a fairness equilibrium in a game containing psychological payoffs. For this to happen the material stakes must be perceived as low and psychological payoffs are expressive. Although the material stakes are actually high, members of each group may choose expressively to support the use of violence because the probability of being decisive is low. The paper also considers the possibility of peace emerging as a fairness equilibrium. This can only happen if each group perceives the other as making some sacrfiÃ‚â€¦ce in choosing peace.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Strathclyde Business School, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 1212.
Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2012
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published
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conflÃ‚â€¡ict; emotions; reciprocity; expressive;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Economics; Underlying Principles
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
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