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The Politics of 1992: Fiscal Policy and European Integration

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Author Info
Persson, Torsten
Tabellini, Guido

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Abstract

The internal market in Europe will greatly increase the international mobility of resources. How will this affect fiscal policy in different countries? We first consider taxation of capital in a two-country model, where a democratically-chosen government in each country chooses tax policy. Higher capital mobility changes the politico-economic equilibrium in two ways. On one hand, it leads to more tax competition between the countries: this `economic effect' tends to lower tax rates in both countries. On the other hand, it alters voters' preferences and makes them elect a different government: this `political effect' offsets the increased tax competition, although not completely. We then consider taxation of labour, in a model where labour is internationally immobile. Eliminating the remaining barriers to trade in goods changes the distribution of labour earnings in the model, which again has a political as well as an economic effect. Again the economic and political effects push the tax rates in different directions, but here the political effect can prevail. The tendency for an adapting political equilibrium to preserve the status quo emerges as a general result of the paper.

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 501.

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Date of creation: Jan 1991
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:501

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Keywords: European Integration Politics Tax Competition

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Grandmont, Jean-Michel, 1978. "Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(2), pages 317-30, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Gordon, Roger H, 1983. "An Optimal Taxation Approach to Fiscal Federalism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(4), pages 567-86, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Meltzer, Allan H & Richard, Scott F, 1981. "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 914-27, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Wildasin, David E., 1988. "Nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 229-240, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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