Why local governments do not maximize profits: on the value added by the representative institutions of town and city governance
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 149 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 (October)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
State and local governance; King and council model; Tax constitution; Productive theories of the state; Constitutional political economy; Colonial American history;
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