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Visigothic Retinues: Roving Bandits that Succeeded Rome

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  • Andrew T. Young

    (West Virginia University, College of Business and Economics)

Abstract

I employ a case study of the Visigoths in the fourth and fifth centuries to analyze the collective action problems faced by roving versus stationary bandits. A roving bandit provides exclusive collective goods to its members. A stationary bandit also provides exclusive goods to its members, but it also provides inclusive collective goods to out-group individuals in its domain. The inclusive goods provided to the out-group are an input to the production of the exclusive goods enjoyed by the in-group members. I describe how the transition from the former to the latter likely involves redefinition of the relevant group, its shared interest, and the type of good(s) that it provides. The Gothic retinues of the fourth century were essentially roving bandits. Having been driven across the Danube into the Roman Empire by an invasion of Huns, a group of these retinues formed the Visigothic confederacy. The Visigoths sacked Rome and were subsequently settled in Gaul, eventually becoming the stationary Visigothic Kingdom. I describe how the Visigothic elite came to recognize an encompassing interest in their domain and drew upon the human capital of the Gallo-Roman senators to provide inclusive collective goods.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrew T. Young, 2015. "Visigothic Retinues: Roving Bandits that Succeeded Rome," Working Papers 15-09, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.
  • Handle: RePEc:wvu:wpaper:15-09
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    File URL: http://busecon.wvu.edu/phd_economics/pdf/15-09.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Andrew T. Young, 2015. "Hospitalitas," Working Papers 15-41, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.
    2. Andrew Young, 2015. "From Caesar to Tacitus: changes in early Germanic governance circa 50 BC-50 AD," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 164(3), pages 357-378, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    collective action problems; governance institutions; state emergence; roving versus stationary bandits; Visigoths; Roman Empire; ancient economic history;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • N43 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Europe: Pre-1913
    • N93 - Economic History - - Regional and Urban History - - - Europe: Pre-1913
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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