Kings and Vikings: On the Dynamics of Competitive Agglomeration
AbstractThis paper studies the Viking age – the roughly 300 year period beginning in 800 AD – from the perspective of the economics of conflict. The Viking age is interesting because throughout the time period, the scale of conflict increased – small scale raiding behaviour eventually evolved into large scale clashes between armies. With this observation in mind, we present a theoretical model describing the incentives both the defending population and the invading population had to agglomerate into larger groups to better defend against attacks, and engage in attacks, respectively. The result is what might be called a theory of competitive agglomeration. We also apply our model in assessing the factors behind the onset of Vikings raids at the end of the 8th century.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by United States Naval Academy Department of Economics in its series Departmental Working Papers with number 11.
Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2005
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Matthew Baker & Erwin Bulte, 2010. "Kings and Vikings: on the dynamics of competitive agglomeration," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 207-227, June.
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
- H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War
- N40 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - General, International, or Comparative
- O12 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
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