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Governance and efficiency with and without Government

Author

Listed:
  • Francesco Angelini

    (Department of Statistics, University of Bologna, Italy)

  • Guido Candela

    (Department of Economics, University of Bologna, Italy)

  • Massimiliano Castellani

    (Department of Statistics, University of Bologna, Italy; Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis)

Abstract

This paper explores the relationships between forms of governance and efficiency, in societies with and without State, with several specific agent behaviors. Using a theoretical framework where the private agents are, or are not, able to efficiently coordinate their actions, we study how forms of governance affect the level of welfare of each society.

Suggested Citation

  • Francesco Angelini & Guido Candela & Massimiliano Castellani, 2018. "Governance and efficiency with and without Government," Working Paper series 18-18, Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis.
    • Handle: RePEc:rim:rimwps:18-18
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    Cited by:

    1. Francesco Angelini & Guido Candela & Massimiliano Castellani, 2020. "Households production in State and stateless societies: three tales and one letter," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 67(1), pages 31-45, March.
    2. Abbas, Hafiz Syed Mohsin & Xu, Xiaodong & Sun, Chunxia, 2022. "The role of state capacity and socio-economic determinants on health quality and its access in Pakistan (1990–2019)," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Governance capacity; Public good; Public choice; Efficiency;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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