This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Public Choice and the Economic Analysis of Anarchy: A Survey

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Powell, Benjamin () (Suffolk University, Department of Economics)
Stringham, Edward P. () (Klagenfurt University)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Public choice economists began studying the economics of anarchy in the 1970s. Since then, the amount of research on anarchy has burgeoned. This article surveys the important public choice contributions to the economics of anarchy. Following the lead of the early public choice economists, many current economists are researching and analyzing how individuals interact without government. From their non-public-interested explanations of the creation of government law enforcement to their historical studies of attempts to internalize externalities under anarchy, public choice scholars are arriving at a more realistic perspective on government and how people interact when government law enforcement is lacking. Although the economics of politics often receives more attention, the economics of anarchy is an important area of research in public choice.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://192.138.214.118/RePEc/docs/wpaper/2008-7.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Suffolk University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2008-7.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 41 pages
Date of creation: 19 Aug 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:suf:wpaper:2008-7

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.suffolk.edu/college/2175.html
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Frank Conte).

Related research
Keywords: Anarchism; Lawlessness; Order; Internalization of Externalities; Self-Governance;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Tullock, Gordon, 1999. "Non-prisoner's dilemma," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 455-458, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Carter, John R. & Anderton, Charles H., 2001. "An experimental test of a predator-prey model of appropriation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 83-97, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Powell, Benjamin & Wilson, Bart J., 2008. "An experimental investigation of Hobbesian jungles," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 66(3-4), pages 669-686, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Martin C. McGuire & Mancur Olson Jr., 1996. "The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible Hand and the Use of Force," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(1), pages 72-96, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Stringham, Edward, 2003. "The extralegal development of securities trading in seventeenth-century Amsterdam," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 321-344. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Duffy, John & Kim, Minseong, 2005. "Anarchy in the laboratory (and the role of the state)," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 297-329, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1995. "Anarchy and Its Breakdown," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 26-52, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Bryan Caplan & Edward Stringham, 2003. "Networks, Law, and the Paradox of Cooperation," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer, vol. 16(4), pages 309-326, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Peter T. Leeson, 2007. "Trading with Bandits," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 50, pages 303-321. [Downloadable!]
  10. Bernstein, Lisa, 1992. "Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(1), pages 115-57, January.
  11. Peter T. Leeson, 2007. "Anarchy, Monopoly, and Predation," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 163(3), pages 467-482, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Telser, L G, 1980. "A Theory of Self-enforcing Agreements," Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(1), pages 27-44, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Greif, Avner, 1993. "Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: the Maghribi Traders' Coalition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(3), pages 525-48, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Leeson, Peter T. & Boettke, Peter J., 2009. "Two-tiered entrepreneurship and economic development," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 252-259, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, 2002. "Opting-Out: the Constitutional Economics of Exit," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 61(1), pages 123-158, 01. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Peter Leeson, 2007. "Efficient anarchy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 130(1), pages 41-53, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Ekelund, Robert B. & Dorton, Cheryl, 2003. "Criminal justice institutions as a common pool: the 19th century analysis of Edwin Chadwick," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 271-294, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. James E. Anderson & Douglas Marcouiller, 2005. "Anarchy And Autarky: Endogenous Predation As A Barrier To Trade," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 46(1), pages 189-213, 02. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  19. Clay, Karen, 1997. "Trade without Law: Private-Order Institutions in Mexican California," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(1), pages 202-31, April.
  20. Peter T. Leeson, 2006. "Self-Enforcing Arrangements and Heterogeneous Groups," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 65(4), pages 891-907, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. Bos, Dieter & Kolmar, Martin, 2003. "Anarchy, efficiency, and redistribution," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(11), pages 2431-2457, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  22. Powell, Benjamin & Ford, Ryan & Nowrasteh, Alex, 2008. "Somalia after state collapse: Chaos or improvement?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 67(3-4), pages 657-670, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  23. Greif, Avner, 1989. "Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(04), pages 857-882, December. [Downloadable!]
  24. R. Hirschowitz, 1989. "The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution in the Third World," South African Journal of Economics, Economic Society of South Africa, vol. 57(4), pages 266-272, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  25. Peter T. Leeson, 2008. "How Important is State Enforcement for Trade?," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(1), pages 61-89. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  26. Kjell Hausken, 2006. "The Stability Of Anarchy And Breakdown Of Production," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 17(6), pages 589-603, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  27. Tullock, Gordon, 1985. "Adam Smith and the Prisoners' Dilemma," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(5), pages 1073-81, Supp.. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  28. Dowd, Kevin, 1997. "Anarchy, Warfare, and Social Order: Comment on Hirshleifer," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(3), pages 648-51, June.
  29. Peter T. Leeson, 2007. "An-arrgh-chy: The Law and Economics of Pirate Organization," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 115(6), pages 1049-1094, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  30. Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter & Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard, 2003. " Rational Bandits: Plunder, Public Goods, and the Vikings," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 117(3-4), pages 255-72, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  31. Edward Stringham, 2006. "Overlapping Jurisdictions, Proprietary Communities, and Competition in the Realm of Law," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 162(3), pages 516-534, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  32. Leeson, Peter T., 2007. "Better off stateless: Somalia before and after government collapse," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 689-710, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  33. Moselle, Boaz & Polak, Benjamin, 2001. "A Model of a Predatory State," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 17(1), pages 1-33, April.
  34. Bush, Winston C. & Mayer, Lawrence S., 1974. "Some implications of anarchy for the distribution of property," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 8(4), pages 401-412, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  35. Peter T. Leeson, 2008. "Social Distance and Self-Enforcing Exchange," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 37(1), pages 161-188, 01. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  36. Benson, Bruce L, 1994. "Are Public Goods Really Common Pools? Considerations of the Evolution of Policing and Highways in England," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 32(2), pages 249-71, April.
  37. Walter Block & Thomas J. DiLorenzo, 2000. "Is Voluntary Government Possible? A Critique of Constitutional Economics," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 156(4), pages 567-, December.
  38. Grossman, Herschel I., 2002. ""Make us a king": anarchy, predation, and the state," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 31-46, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  39. Tullock, Gordon, 1971. "Public Decisions as Public Goods," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 79(4), pages 913-18, July-Aug.. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You may want to explore EconPapers, which displays the same data as IDEAS in a different way.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-14.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.