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Persistence of Civil Wars

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Author Info
Acemoglu, Daron () (MIT)
Ticchi, Davide () (University of Urbino)
Vindigni, Andrea () (Princeton University)

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Abstract

A notable feature of post-World War II civil wars is their very long average duration. We provide a theory of the persistence of civil wars. The civilian government can successfully defeat rebellious factions only by creating a relatively strong army. In weakly-institutionalized polities this opens the way for excessive influence or coups by the military. Civilian governments whose rents are largely unaffected by civil wars then choose small and weak armies that are incapable of ending insurrections. Our framework also shows that when civilian governments need to take more decisive action against rebels, they may be forced to build over-sized armies, beyond the size necessary for fighting the insurrection, as a commitment to not reforming the military in the future.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 4418.

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Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2009
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Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp4418

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Related research
Keywords: civil wars; commitment; coups; military; political transitions; political economy;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
N10 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Growth and Fluctuations - - - General, International, or Comparative
N40 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, and Regulation - - - General, International, or Comparative
P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism

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This page was last updated on 2009-11-23.

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