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Persistence of Civil Wars

Author Info

  • Daron Acemoglu
  • Davide Ticchi
  • Andrea Vindigni

Abstract

A notable feature of post-World War II civil wars is their very long average duration. We provide a theory of the persistence of civil wars. The civilian government can successfully defeat rebellious factions only by creating a relatively strong army. In weakly-institutionalized polities this opens the way for excessive influence or coups by the military. Civilian governments whose rents are largely unaffected by civil wars then choose small and weak armies that are incapable of ending insurrections. Our framework also shows that when civilian governments need to take more decisive action against rebels, they may be forced to build over-sized armies, beyond the size necessary for fighting the insurrection, as a commitment to not reforming the military in the future.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 15378.

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Date of creation: Sep 2009
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Publication status: published as Daron Acemoglu & Davide Ticchi & Andrea Vindigni, 2010. "Persistence of Civil Wars," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 8(2-3), pages 664-676, 04-05.
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:15378
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
  • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
  • N10 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations - - - General, International, or Comparative
  • N40 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - General, International, or Comparative
  • P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism

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  1. Konstantin Sonin & Georgy Egorov & Daron Acemoglu, 2008. "Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalitions and Clubs," 2008 Meeting Papers 314, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  2. Daron Acemoglu & Davide Ticchi & Andrea Vindigni, 2008. "A Theory of Military Dictatorships," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 74, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
  3. Daron Acemoglu, 2005. "Politics and Economics in Weak and Strong States," NBER Working Papers 11275, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Daron Agemoglu & Davide Ticchi & Andrea Vindigni, 2006. "Emergence and Persistence of Inefficient States," LABORatorio R. Revelli Working Papers Series 54, LABORatorio R. Revelli, Centre for Employment Studies.
  5. HÃ¥vard Hegre, 2004. "The Duration and Termination of Civil War," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 41(3), pages 243-252, May.
  6. Christopher Blattman & Edward Miguel, 2009. "Civil War," NBER Working Papers 14801, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Acemoglu,Daron & Robinson,James A., 2006. "Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521855266, November.
  8. Karl R. de Rouen JR & David Sobek, 2004. "The Dynamics of Civil War Duration and Outcome," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 41(3), pages 303-320, May.
  9. Collier, Paul & Hoeffler, Anke & Soderbom, Mans, 2001. "On the duration of civil war," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2681, The World Bank.
  10. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson & Rafael Santos, 2009. "The Monopoly of Violence: Evidence from Colombia," NBER Working Papers 15578, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Jeffrey Herbst, 2004. "African Militaries and Rebellion: The Political Economy of Threat and Combat Effectiveness," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 41(3), pages 357-369, May.
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