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The political economy of organized crime: providing protection when the state does not

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Author Info
Stergios Skaperdas

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Abstract

Organized crime emerges out of the power vaccuum that is created by the absence of state enforcement, and which can have many sources: geographic, social, and ethnic distance, prohibition, or simply collapse of state institutions. Mafias and gangs are hierarchically organized and can be thought of as providing primitive state functions, with economic costs that are typically much higher than those associated with modern governance. Though organized crime cannot be completely eradicated, its control is necessary, since it can easily corrupt existing institutions of governance. Some thoughts on what can be done to control organized crime are offered. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2001

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Economics of Governance.

Volume (Year): 2 (2001)
Issue (Month): 3 (November)
Pages: 173-202
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Handle: RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:2:y:2001:i:3:p:173-202

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Related research
Keywords: Key words: anarchy; conflict; JEL classification: H1; K0; L8;

Cited by:
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  1. Panu Poutvaara & Mikael Priks, 2007. "Unemployment and Gang Crime: Could Prosperity Backfire?," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Rute Imanishi Rodrigues, 2005. "O Lugar Dos Pobres E A Violência Na Cidade: Um Estudo Para O Município De São Paulo," Anais do XXXIII Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 33th Brazilian Economics Meeting] 154, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pósgraduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics]. [Downloadable!]
  3. Konrad, Kai A, 2001. "Investment in the Absence of Property Rights: The Role of Incumbency Advantages," CEPR Discussion Papers 3050, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Ethan Bueno De Mesquita & Catherine Hafer, 2008. "Public Protection Or Private Extortion?," Economics and Politics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 20(1), pages 1-32, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Stergios Skaperdas, 2009. "The Costs of Organized Violence: A Review of the Evidence," Working Papers 080924, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Stergios Skaperdas, 2007. "An Economic Approach to Analyzing Civil War," Working Papers 060715, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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