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Persistence of civil wars

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Author Info

  • Acemoglu, Daron
  • Ticchi, Davide
  • Vindigni, Andrea

Abstract

A notable feature of post-World War II civil wars is their very long average duration. We provide a theory of the persistence of civil wars. The civilian government can successfully defeat rebellious factions only by creating a relatively strong army. In weakly-institutionalized polities this opens the way for excessive influence or coups by the military. Civilian governments whose rents are largely unaffected by civil wars then choose small and weak armies that are incapableof ending insurrections. Our framework also shows that when civilian governments need totake more decisive action against rebels, they may be forced to build over-sized armies, beyond the size necessary for fighting the insurrection, as a commitment to not reforming the military in the future.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS in its series POLIS Working Papers with number 130.

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Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:uca:ucapdv:130

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Web page: http://polis.unipmn.it

Related research

Keywords: civil wars; commitment; coups; military; political transitions; political economy.;

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References

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  1. Christopher Blattman & Edward Miguel, 2009. "Civil War," NBER Working Papers 14801, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Daron Acemoglu & Davide Ticchi & Andrea Vindigni, 2011. "Emergence And Persistence Of Inefficient States," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 177-208, 04.
  3. Daron Acemoglu, 2005. "Politics and Economics in Weak and Strong States," NBER Working Papers 11275, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Acemoglu, Daron & Ticchi, Davide & Vindigni, Andrea, 2008. "A Theory of Military Dictatorships," IZA Discussion Papers 3392, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  5. Daron Acemoglu & Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2012. "Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalitions, and Clubs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(4), pages 1446-76, June.
  6. Acemoglu,Daron & Robinson,James A., 2006. "Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521855266.
  7. Collier, Paul & Hoeffler, Anke & Soderbom, Mans, 2001. "On the duration of civil war," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2681, The World Bank.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Saint-Paul, Gilles & Ticchi, Davide & Vindigni, Andrea, 2012. "A Theory of Political Entrenchment," TSE Working Papers 12-284, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  2. J. Atsu Amegashie, 2014. "Regime Spoiler or Regime Pawn: The Military and Distributional Conflict in Non-Democracies," CESifo Working Paper Series 4770, CESifo Group Munich.
  3. Rohner, Dominic & Thoenig, Mathias & Zilibotti, Fabrizio, 2011. "War Signals: A Theory of Trade, Trust and Conflict," CEPR Discussion Papers 8352, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Ibrahim Ahmed Elbadawi & Raimundo Soto, 2013. "Resource Rents, Institutions and Violent Civil Conflicts," Documentos de Trabajo 438, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
  5. Pauline Grosjean, 2013. "Conflict and Social and Political Preferences: Evidence from World War II and Civil Conflict in 35 European countries," Discussion Papers 2013-29, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
  6. Orso, Cristina Elisa, 2009. "Formal and informal sectors: Interactions between moneylenders and traditional banks in the rural Indian credit market," POLIS Working Papers 135, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
  7. Amegashie, J. Atsu, 2014. "Regime spoiler or regime pawn: the military and distributional conflict in non-democracies," MPRA Paper 55336, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson & Rafael Santos, 2009. "The Monopoly of Violence: Evidence from Colombia," NBER Working Papers 15578, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Leander Heldring, 2014. "State Capacity and Violence: Evidence from the Rwandan genocide," CSAE Working Paper Series 2014-08, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
  10. Bodea, Cristina, 2012. "Natural resources, weak states and civil war : can rents stabilize coup prone regimes ?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6071, The World Bank.
  11. Caleb Stroup & Benjamin Zissimos, 2011. "Pampered Bureaucracy, Political Stability, and Trade Integration," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 1105, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
  12. Baddeley, M., 2011. "Civil War and Human Development: Impacts of Finance and Financial Infrastructure," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1127, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  13. Giuranno, Michele, 2009. "The logic of party coalitions with political activism and public financing," POLIS Working Papers 134, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.

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