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Choix d’imposition et interactions spatiales entre collectivités locales : un test sur les départements français

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Author Info

  • Matthieu LEPRINCE

    (CREM, Université de Rennes 1)

  • Sonia PATY

    (MEDEE, IFRESI-CNRS, Université des Sciences et Technologies de Lille)

  • Emmanuelle REULIER

    (CREM, Université de Rennes 1)

Abstract

L'objectif de cet article est de tester économétriquement l'existence d'interactions spatiales entre les choix d'imposition des départements français de métropole. Pour cela, un modèle de choix fiscal avec auto-régression spatiale est spécifié pour estimer la pente de la fonction de meilleure réponse qui relie le taux d'impôt d'un département aux taux votés par les départements voisins pour le même impôt. Nous montrons que pour l'année 1999, l'hypothèse d'interactions fiscales horizontales ne peut être rejetée pour trois des quatre impôts départementaux étudies, notamment pour la taxe professionnelle qui pèse uniquement sur les entreprises. À l'inverse, la fixation du taux départemental de la taxe d'habitation, qui pèse uniquement sur les ménages, ne semble pas gouvernée par les décisions des départements concurrents. Ces résultats sont compatibles à la fois avec les modèles de concurrence fiscale à la Wildasin (1988) et ceux de concurrence par comparaison à la Besley et Case (1995a).

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) in its series Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) with number 2005013.

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Length: 28
Date of creation: 01 Mar 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvre:2005013

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Keywords: Concurrence fiscale; Concurrence par comparaison; Impôts locaux;

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Matthieu Leprince & Thierry Madiès & Sonia Paty, 2007. "Business Tax Interactions Among Local Governments: An Empirical Analysis Of The French Case," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(3), pages 603-621.
  2. Aurélie Cassette & Sonia Paty, 2006. "La concurrence fiscale entre communes est-elle plus intense en milieu urbain qu’en milieu rural ?," Cahiers d'Economie et Sociologie Rurales, INRA Department of Economics, vol. 78, pages 5-30.
  3. Thierry Madiès & Sonia Paty & Yvon Rocaboy, 2005. "Externalités fiscales horizontales et verticales. Où en est la théorie du fédéralisme financier ?," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 0(1), pages 17-63.
  4. Thierry Madiès & Sonia Paty & Yvon Rocaboy, 2005. "Les stratégies fiscales des collectivités locales. De la théorie à la réalité," Revue de l'OFCE, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 94(3), pages 283-315.
  5. Eric Dubois & Matthieu Leprince & Sonia Paty, 2007. "The Effects of Politics on Local Tax Setting: Evidence from France," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00800688, HAL.
  6. Ruiz, Fernando & Gerard, Marcel, 2008. "Is there evidence of strategic corporate tax interaction among EU countries?," MPRA Paper 10094, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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