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Taxable Agglomeration Rent: Evidence From A Panel Data

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  • Sylvie Charlot
  • Sonia Paty

Abstract

The main purpose of this paper is to test the existence of a taxable agglomeration rent in the French local tax setting by taking account the tax interactions among the urban jurisdictions. After presenting a simple economic geography model with fiscal interactions, we estimate a model of tax setting for the local business tax using the econometrics techniques on panel data for 1993 to 2002. We observe that the relationship between tax rate and fiscal base gives presumption of the existence of a taxable agglomeration rent.

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File URL: http://www2.dijon.inra.fr/cesaer/workingpapers/RePEc/ceo/wpaper/WP2006_1.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by INRA UMR CESAER, Centre d'’Economie et Sociologie appliquées à l'’Agriculture et aux Espaces Ruraux in its series INRA UMR CESAER Working Papers with number 2006/1.

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Length: 22
Date of creation: 15 Mar 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ceo:wpaper:20

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Related research

Keywords: Spatial autocorelation panel; Economic geography; Fiscal agglomeration rent;

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References

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