Tax interactions among Belgian municipalities: Do interregional differences matter?
Abstract
This paper tests the existence of strategic interactions among municipalities, based on a panel of Belgian local tax rates from 1985 to 2004. A special emphasis is put on the role of the interregional differences in Belgium. Our results partly confirm previous findings for Belgium suggesting that municipalities interact over the local surcharge on the (labor) income tax rate but not on the local surcharge on the property tax. Using spatial econometrics tools and an original methodology for specifying weight matrices, we find that municipalities are sensitive to the local income tax rates set by only their closest neighbors. We cannot reject the hypothesis that interregional differences matter for municipalities belonging to the Brussels region: for the local income tax rate, the intensity of interactions is shown to be higher between municipalities belonging to the Brussels region than between municipalities belonging to different regions.Download Info
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Bibliographic Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Regional Science and Urban Economics.
Volume (Year): 40 (2010)
Issue (Month): 5 (September)
Pages: 336-342
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/regec
Related research
Keywords: Tax interactions Panel data Spatial econometrics Local tax rates Tax competition;References
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Marcel Gérard & Laurent van Malderen, 2012. "Tax Interaction among Walloon Municipalities: Is there Room for Yardstick Competition, Intellectual Trend and Partisan Monopoly Effect?," CESifo Working Paper Series 4025, CESifo Group Munich.
- Geys, Benny & Osterloh, Steffen, 2011. "Politicians' opinions on rivals in the competition for firms: An empirical analysis of reference points near a border," ZEW Discussion Papers 11-020, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
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Benny Geys & Federico Revelli, 2011. "Economic and political foundations of local tax structures: an empirical investigation of the tax mix of Flemish municipalities," Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, Pion Ltd, London, vol. 29(3), pages 410-427, June. - Michael Keen & Kai A. Konrad, 2012. "International Tax Competition and Coordination," Working Papers international_tax_competi, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
- Cassette, Aurélie & Di Porto, Edoardo & Foremny, Dirk, 2012. "Strategic fiscal interaction across borders: Evidence from French and German local governments along the Rhine Valley," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 17-30.
- Iwata, Shinichiro & Sumita, Kazuto & Fujisawa, Mieko, 2012. "Price competition in the spatial real estate market: Allies or rivals?," MPRA Paper 37438, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Marie-Estelle Binet & Alain Guengant & Matthieu Leprince, 2012. "Overlapping jurisdictions and demand for local public services: does spatial heterogeneity matter?," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 201213, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
- Geys, Benny & Osterloh, Steffen, 2012. "Borders as boundaries to fiscal policy interactions? An empirical analysis of politicians' opinions on rivals in the competition for firms," Discussion Papers, Research Professorship & Project "The Future of Fiscal Federalism" SP II 2012-113, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
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