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Vertical income tax externalities and fiscal interdependence : evidence from the US

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Author Info
Esteller-Moré, Álex
Solé-Ollé, Albert

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Abstract

Concurrent taxation is a feature of many federal systems. As a consequence of this fact, the tax policy of one level of government affects the tax base of the other. This paper carries out a theoretical analysis of the interdependent tax-setting decisions of federal and regional governments, paying special attention to institutional features that characterise the U.S. federal system in practice and that formally link the taxes employed at various levels of government (i.e.: tax deductibility). The developed hypotheses are tested with data corresponding to the U.S. personal income taxes for the last decade. We find that when the federal government increases taxes, there is a significant positive response of regional taxes.

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Paper provided by ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research in its series ZEW Discussion Papers with number 99-28.

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Date of creation: 1999
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:zewdip:5243

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
H3 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents
H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

References listed on IDEAS
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    Other versions:
  4. Johnson, William R, 1988. "Income Redistribution in a Federal System," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(3), pages 570-73, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Mullen, John K. & Williams, Martin, 1994. "Marginal tax rates and state economic growth," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 687-705, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  18. Besley, Timothy J. & Rosen, Harvey S., 1998. "Vertical externalities in tax setting: evidence from gasoline and cigarettes," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(3), pages 383-398, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  19. Douglas Holtz-Eakin & Harvey S. Rosen, 1987. "Tax Deductibility and Municipal Budget Structure," NBER Working Papers 2224, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  24. Arnott, Richard & Grieson, Ronald E., 1981. "Optimal fiscal policy for a state or local government," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 23-48, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Linda Andersson & Thomas Aronsson & Magnus Wikström, 2004. "Testing for Vertical Fiscal Externalities," Asia-Pacific Financial Markets, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 243-263, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Fredriksson, Per & Mamun, Khawaja, 2009. "Gubernatorial Reputation and Vertical Tax Externalities: All Smoke, No Fire?," Working Papers 2009002, Sacred Heart University, John F. Welch College of Business. [Downloadable!]
  3. Fredriksson, Per & Mamun, Khawaja, 2009. "Tobacco Politics and Electoral Accountability in the United States," Working Papers 2009003, Sacred Heart University, John F. Welch College of Business. [Downloadable!]
  4. Rizzo, Leonzio, 2007. "Interaction between vertical and horizontal tax competition: evidence and some theory," MPRA Paper 8632, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2008. [Downloadable!]
  5. Marius BRÜLHART & Mario JAMETTI, 2004. "Vertical Versus Horizontal Tax Externalities: An Empirical Test," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 04.11, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Rizzo, Leonzio, 2005. "Interaction between Vertical and Horizontal tax Competition: Theory and Evidence," MPRA Paper 5334, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  7. Diego Martínez-López, 2005. "Fiscal federalism and public inputs provision - vertical externalities matter," Working Paper Series 484, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
  8. Ruiz, Fernando & Gerard, Marcel, 2008. "Is there evidence of strategic corporate tax interaction among EU countries?," MPRA Paper 10094, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  9. William Hoyt, 2005. "The Assignment and Division of the Tax Base in a System of Hierarchical Governments," Working Papers 2005-07, University of Kentucky, Institute for Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations. [Downloadable!]
  10. Federico Revelli, 2005. "On Spatial Public Finance Empirics," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 475-492, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Devereux, Michael & Lockwood, Ben & Redoano, Michela, 2004. "Horizontal And Vertical Indirect Tax Competition : Theory And Some Evidence From The Usa," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 704, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Elschner, Christina & Lammersen, Lothar & Overesch, Michael & Schwager, Robert, 2005. "The Effective Tax Burden of Companies and on Highly Skilled Manpower : Tax Policy Strategies in a Globalized Economy," ZEW Discussion Papers 05-31, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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