An Expressive Voting Theory Of Strikes
AbstractUnion members may vote for a strike even if they do not expect to thereby increase their wages. For under majority voting any one member's vote for a strike is unlikely to be decisive. A union member who obtains a noninfinitesimal emotional benefit from the act of voting for a strike may therefore vote in its favor. This hypothesis can explain the existence of strikes and the conditions that make strikes especially likely. Copyright 1992 by Oxford University Press.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by California Irvine - School of Social Sciences in its series Papers with number 89-4.
Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: 1989
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA IRVINE, SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, IRVINECALIFORNIA 91717 U.S.A.
trade unions ; voting ; strikes;
Other versions of this item:
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Christa Brunnschweiler & Colin Jennings & Ian MacKenzie, 2012.
"Rebellion against Reason? A Study of Expressive Choice and Strikes,"
1205, University of Strathclyde Business School, Department of Economics.
- Christa N. Brunnschweiler & Colin Jennings & Ian A. MacKenzie, 2012. "Rebellion against Reason? A Study of Expressive Choice and Strikes," Working Paper Series 13012, Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology.
- Christa N. Brunnschweiler & Colin Jennings & Ian A. MacKenzie, 2012. "Rebellion against Reason? A Study of Expressive Choice and Strikes," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 12/162, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
- Colin Jennings & Alan Hamlin, 2004.
"Leadership and Conflict,"
Economics Series Working Papers
200, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Hillman, Arye L., 2010. "Expressive behavior in economics and politics," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 403-418, December.
- Reiner Eichenberger & Felix Oberholzer-Gee, 1998.
"Rational moralists: The role of fairness in democratic economic politics,"
Springer, vol. 94(1), pages 191-210, January.
- Eichenberger, Reiner & Oberholzer-Gee, Felix, 1998. " Rational Moralists: The Role of Fairness in Democratic Economic Politics," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(1-2), pages 191-210, January.
- Kallbekken, Steffen & Kroll, Stephan & Cherry, Todd L., 2011. "Do you not like Pigou, or do you not understand him? Tax aversion and revenue recycling in the lab," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 53-64, July.
- Amihai Glazer, 2008. "Voting to anger and to please others," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 134(3), pages 247-254, March.
- Tyran, Jean-Robert, 2004.
"Voting when money and morals conflict: an experimental test of expressive voting,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 88(7-8), pages 1645-1664, July.
- Jean-Robert Tyran, 2002. "Voting when Money and Morals Conflict - An Experimental Test of Expressive Voting," University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2002 2002-07, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.