Voting when Money and Morals Conflict - An Experimental Test of Expressive Voting
AbstractMoral considerations may matter much in voting because the costs of expressing support for a morally worthy cause may be low in a referendum. These costs depend on whether a voter expects to affect the outcome of the referendum. To test the low-cost theory of expressive voting, we experimentally investigate a proposal to tax everyone and donate tax revenues. The analysis of expectations and voting decisions shows that expressive voting is common. However, the low-cost theory fails to explain voting decisions. Instead of affecting the costs of expressive voting, expectations appear to affect its benefits.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen in its series University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2002 with number 2002-07.
Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2002
Date of revision:
Expressive voting; low-cost theory; laboratory experiments.;
Other versions of this item:
- Tyran, Jean-Robert, 2004. "Voting when money and morals conflict: an experimental test of expressive voting," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 88(7-8), pages 1645-1664, July.
- A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values
- C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2002-06-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2002-06-13 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-EXP-2002-06-13 (Experimental Economics)
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