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Voting when Money and Morals Conflict - An Experimental Test of Expressive Voting

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Author Info
Jean-Robert Tyran ()

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Abstract

Moral considerations may matter much in voting because the costs of expressing support for a morally worthy cause may be low in a referendum. These costs depend on whether a voter expects to affect the outcome of the referendum. To test the low-cost theory of expressive voting, we experimentally investigate a proposal to tax everyone and donate tax revenues. The analysis of expectations and voting decisions shows that expressive voting is common. However, the low-cost theory fails to explain voting decisions. Instead of affecting the costs of expressive voting, expectations appear to affect its benefits.

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File URL: http://www.vwa.unisg.ch/RePEc/usg/dp2002/dp0207tyran_ganz.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen in its series University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2002 with number 2002-07.

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Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2002
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Handle: RePEc:usg:dp2002:2002-07

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Related research
Keywords: Expressive voting; low-cost theory; laboratory experiments.;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values
C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Carter, John R & Guerette, Stephen D, 1992. " An Experimental Study of Expressive Voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 73(3), pages 251-60, April.
  2. Lars Feld & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2002. "Why People Obey the Law: Experimental Evidence from the Provision of Public Goods," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  3. Glazer, Amihai, 1992. "An Expressive Voting Theory of Strikes," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 30(4), pages 733-41, October.
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  4. Eckel, Catherine C. & Grossman, Philip J., 1996. "Altruism in Anonymous Dictator Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 181-191, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Iris Bohnet & Bruno S. Frey, 1999. "Social Distance and Other-Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 335-339, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Brennan, Geoffrey & Hamlin, Alan, 1998. " Expressive Voting and Electoral Equilibrium," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 95(1-2), pages 149-75, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Cummings, Ronald G, et al, 1997. "Are Hypothetical Referenda Incentive Compatible?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(3), pages 609-21, June.
  8. Eichenberger, Reiner & Oberholzer-Gee, Felix, 1998. " Rational Moralists: The Role of Fairness in Democratic Economic Politics," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(1-2), pages 191-210, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Harbaugh, William T., 1998. "What do donations buy?: A model of philanthropy based on prestige and warm glow," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 269-284, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Hoffman, Elizabeth & McCabe, Kevin & Smith, Vernon L, 1996. "Social Distance and Other-Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 653-60, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge, 1981. "Selfishness versus public `regardingness' in voting behavior," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 349-361, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Urs Fischbacher & Simon Gaechter & Ernst Fehr, . "Are People Conditionally Cooperative? Evidence from a Public Goods Experiment," IEW - Working Papers iewwp016, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
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  13. Andreoni, James, 1990. "Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 100(401), pages 464-77, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Bolton, G. & Katok, E., 1995. "An Experimental Test of the Crowding Out Hypothesis: The Nature of Beneficient Behavior," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 295.95, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
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  15. Brennan, Geoffrey, 2001. "Five Rational Actor Accounts of the Welfare State," Kyklos, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 54(2-3), pages 213-33.
  16. Hong, Chew Soo & Konrad, Kai A, 1998. "Bandwagon Effects and Two-Party Majority Voting," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 165-72, May-June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Urs Fischbacher & Simon Gaechter, 2006. "Heterogeneous social preferences and the dynamics of free riding in public goods," Discussion Papers 2006-01, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Stephen Drinkwater & Colin Jennings, 2007. "Who are the expressive voters?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(1), pages 179-189, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Monika Bütler & Michel André Maréchal, 2007. "Framing Effects in Political Decision Making: Evidence From a Natural Voting Experiment," University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2007 2007-04, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Jeffrey P. Carpenter & Amrita Daniere & Lois Takahashi, 2004. "Cooperation, Trust and Social Capital in Southeast Asian Urban Slums," Artefactual Field Experiments 0031, The Field Experiments Website. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Jean-Robert Tyran & Rupert Sausgruber, 2002. "A Little Fairness may Induce a Lot of Redistribution in Democracy," University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2002 2002-30, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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