Abstention because of Indifference and Alienation, and Its Consequences for Party Competition: A Simple Psychological Model
AbstractThe basic idea behind this paper is that voters have to be able to distinguish the positions of the parties. Following Weber’s Law this depends on the relative distance with respect to their own optimal position. Using such a measure a model of voter participation is developed which allows for abstention because of indifference as well as alienation. Two variants of this model are applied on a two parties contest: one where participation is proportional to the relative distance and another one where voters participate if this distance is above a certain convergence to the median voter’s position.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen in its series University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2003 with number 2003-12.
Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2003
Date of revision:
Voting Behaviour; Abstention; Perception of Differences; Party Competition;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H19 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Other
- P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
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