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A Model Of Endogenous Political Party Platforms

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Author Info

  • Andrei Gomberg

    (Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México)

  • Francisco Marhuenda

    (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)

  • Ignacio Ortuño Ortín

    (Universidad de Alicante)

Abstract

We develop a model of endogenous party platform formation in a multidimensional policy space. Party platforms depend on the composition of the parties? primary electorate. The overall social outcome is taken to be a weighted average of party platforms and individuals vote strategically. Equilibrium is defined to obtain when no group of voters can shift the social outcome in its favor by deviating and the party platforms are consistent with their electorate. We provide sufficient conditions for existence and study the robustness properties of the sorting equilibria.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) in its series Working Papers. Serie AD with number 2003-12.

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Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2003
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published by Ivie
Handle: RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2003-12

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Keywords: Political Economy; Endogenous Party Formation; Multimensional Space.;

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References

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  1. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1996. "Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(2), pages 265-86, April.
  2. Nalebuff, B. & Caplin, A., 1992. "Competition Among Institutions," Discussion Papers 1992_36, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
  3. John E. Roemer, . "The Democratic Political Economy Of Progressive Income Taxation," Department of Economics 97-11, California Davis - Department of Economics.
  4. Mclennan, A., 1989. "Selected Topics In The Theory Of Fixed Points," Papers 251, Minnesota - Center for Economic Research.
  5. Ignacio Ortuno-Ortin & Anke Gerber, 1998. "Political compromise and endogenous formation of coalitions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 445-454.
  6. Osborne, Martin J & Slivinski, Al, 1996. "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 111(1), pages 65-96, February.
  7. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1997. "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(1), pages 85-114, February.
  8. Caplin, A. & Nalebuff, B., 1989. "Aggregation And Social Choice: A Mean Voter Theorem," Discussion Papers 1989_31, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
  9. Martin J. Osborne, 1995. "Spatial Models of Political Competition under Plurality Rule: A Survey of Some Explanations of the Number of Candidates and the Positions They Take," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 28(2), pages 261-301, May.
  10. Ignacio OrtuÓo-OrtÎn, 1997. "A spatial model of political competition and proportional representation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 427-438.
  11. Ignacio Ortuño Ortín & John E. Roemer, 2000. "Endogenous Party Formation And The Effect Of Income Distribution On Policy," Working Papers. Serie AD 2000-06, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  12. Poutvaara, Panu, 2003. "Party platforms with endogenous party membership," Munich Reprints in Economics 19298, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  13. Alesina, Alberto, 1988. "Credibility and Policy Convergence in a Two-Party System with Rational Voters," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 796-805, September.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Katsuya Kobayashi & Hideo Konishi, 2013. "Endogenous Party Line," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 848, Boston College Department of Economics.
  2. Vincent Anesi & Philippe De Donder, 2013. "A coalitional theory of unemployment insurance and employment protection," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 52(3), pages 941-977, April.
  3. Woojin Lee, 2011. "Bandwagon, underdog, and political competition: the uni-dimensional case," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 423-449, April.
  4. Jon Eguia, 2013. "On the spatial representation of preference profiles," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 52(1), pages 103-128, January.
  5. Andrei Gomberg & Francisco Marhuenda & Ignacio Ortuño-Ortín, 2013. "Endogenous party platforms; "Stochastic" Membership," Working Papers 1307, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
  6. Dhillon, Amrita, 2004. "Political Parties And Coalition Formation," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 697, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.

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