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How Have Catch Shares Been Allocated?

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Author Info

  • John Lynham

    ()
    (Department of Economics, University of Hawaii at Manoa, USA)

Abstract

A unique database was created that describes the methods used to allocate shares in nearly every major catch share fishery in the world. The main approaches used to allocate catch shares include: (i) auctions, (ii) equal allocation, (iii) historical catch records and (iv) vessel- or gear-based rules. 54% of the major catch share fisheries in the world allocated the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) on the basis of historical catch records, 3% used auctions, and 6% used equal sharing rules. 37% used a combination of methods, including vessel-based rules. 91% of the fisheries in the database allocated some fraction of the TAC on the basis of historical catch. These results confirm the widely-held belief that nearly all catch share programs have “grandfathered” private access to fishery resources. This publicly available database should be a useful reference tool for policymakers, academics, and others interested in catch shares management in Hawai‘i and across the globe.

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File URL: http://www.economics.hawaii.edu/research/workingpapers/WP_12-19.pdf
File Function: First version, 2012
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 201219.

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Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hai:wpaper:201219

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Related research

Keywords: catch shares; ITQ; allocation; auction;

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References

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  1. Stavins Robert N., 1995. "Transaction Costs and Tradeable Permits," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 133-148, September.
  2. Juan-Pablo Montero & José Miguel Sánchez & Ricardo Katz, 2000. "A Market-Based Environmental Policy Experiment in Chile," Documentos de Trabajo 192, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
  3. Cason, Timothy N., 2010. "What Can Laboratory Experiments Teach Us About Emissions Permit Market Design?," Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association, vol. 39(2), April.
  4. Anferova, Elena & Vetemaa, Markus & Hannesson, Rögnvaldur, 2005. "Fish quota auctions in the Russian Far East: a failed experiment," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 47-56, January.
  5. Christopher M. Anderson & Daniel S. Holland, 2006. "Auctions for Initial Sale of Annual Catch Entitlement," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 82(3), pages 333-352.
  6. Matthew Turner & Quinn Weninger, 2005. "Meetings with Costly Participation: An Empirical Analysis," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 72(1), pages 247-268.
  7. Christopher Costello & John Lynham & Sarah E. Lester & Steven D. Gaines, 2010. "Economic Incentives and Global Fisheries Sustainability," Annual Review of Resource Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 2(1), pages 299-318, October.
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Cited by:
  1. Zafer Kanik & Serkan Kucuksenel, 2013. "The Promise of Transferable Fishing Concessions on EU Fisheries," ERC Working Papers 1312, ERC - Economic Research Center, Middle East Technical University, revised Dec 2013.

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