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Asymmetric Equilibria in a Model with Costly Voting

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  • FRANCESCO DE SINOPOLI
  • GIOVANNA IANNANTUONI

Abstract

Most of the voting models limit their analysis to the investigation of symmetric equilibria where “similar” voters make “similar” voting decisions. In this paper we examine the validity of this restriction in a model with costly plurality voting. We first show that in any pure strategy equilibrium every two individuals who have the same preferences and participate in elections, would vote for the same candidate. However, this result does not hold for mixed strategies equilibria.

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  • Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2007. "Asymmetric Equilibria in a Model with Costly Voting," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(1), pages 29-40, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:9:y:2007:i:1:p:29-40
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2007.00296.x
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    1. De Sinopoli, F. & Iannantuoni, G., 2005. "On Asymmetric Behaviors if Voting is Costly," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0521, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
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    Cited by:

    1. Friedel Bolle, 2022. "Voting with abstention," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 24(1), pages 30-57, February.

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