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When To Run And When To Hide: Electoral Coordination And Exit

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  • INDRIDI H. INDRIDASON

Abstract

Elections represent a coordination problem for voters and candidates for office. Electoral coordination is also the causal mechanism behind any explanation of the relationship between electoral systems and the number of parties. I present a dynamic model of electoral coordination with candidate exit. The model extends two important results from the literature to a dynamic setting. The extension of Duverger's Law and the median‐voter theorem also offers a simultaneous prediction of the number of parties and their ideological positions. Coordination failure is shown to be possible in a mixed‐strategy equilibrium.

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  • Indridi H. Indridason, 2008. "When To Run And When To Hide: Electoral Coordination And Exit," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(1), pages 80-105, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:20:y:2008:i:1:p:80-105
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0343.2007.00315.x
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    1. David P. Myatt, 2005. "Instant Exit from the Asymmetric War of Attrition," Economics Series Working Papers 160, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    2. Hendricks, Kenneth & Wilson, Charles, 1985. "The War of Attrition in Discrete Time," Working Papers 85-32, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
    3. DE SINOPOLI, Francesco & TURRINI, Alessandro, 1999. "A remark on voters’ rationality in Besley and coate model of representative democracy," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1999027, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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    1. repec:gig:joupla:v:3:y:2011:i:2:p:3-41 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Indridi H Indridason, 2013. "Expressive motives and third-party candidates," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 25(2), pages 182-213, April.

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