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NAFTA and productivity convergence between Mexico and the US

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    Abstract

    This paper studies whether NAFTA contributed to the productivity convergence between Mexico and the US. Using data from the manufacturing sector and introducing a number of refinements in the computation of the total factor productivity and estimation methods, it shows that NAFTA is associated with a higher speed of convergence of productivity levels than the previous literature found. The paper also finds that under NAFTA the industries which have smaller productivity gap experienced higher speed of convergence (catch-up) than the industries which have larger productivity gap.

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    File URL: http://repec.graduateinstitute.ch/pdfs/Working_papers/HEIWP27-2007.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies in its series IHEID Working Papers with number 26-2007.

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    Length: 28
    Date of creation: 11 Oct 2007
    Date of revision: 27 Nov 2007
    Handle: RePEc:gii:giihei:heiwp27-2007

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    Keywords: NAFTA; Productivity;

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