An Evolutionary Analysis of the Volunteer`s Dilemma
AbstractThe volunteer`s dilemma is an asymmetric n-player binary-action game in which a public good is provided if and only if at least one player volunteers, and consequently bears some private cost. So long as the value generated for every player exceeds this private cost there are n pure-strategy Nash equilibria in each of which a single player volunteers. Quantal-response strategy revisions allow play to move between the different equilibria. A complete characterisation of long-run play as strategy revisions approximate best replies provides an equilibrium selection device. The volunteer need not be the lowest-cost player: relatively high-cost, but nonetheless stable players may instead provide the public good. The cost of provision is (weakly) reduced when higher values are associated with lower costs.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 270.
Date of creation: 01 Jul 2006
Date of revision:
Volunteer`s Dilemma; Public Goods; Evolution; Equilibrium Selection; Concordance;
Other versions of this item:
- Myatt, David P. & Wallace, Chris, 2008. "An evolutionary analysis of the volunteer's dilemma," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 67-76, January.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-09-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-EVO-2006-09-23 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2006-09-23 (Game Theory)
- NEP-PBE-2006-09-23 (Public Economics)
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