Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

On a General class of stochastic co-evolutionary dynamics

Contents:

Author Info

Abstract

This paper presents a unified framework to study the co-evolution of networks and play, using the language of evolutionary game theory. We show by examples that the set-up is rich enough to encompass many recent models discussed by the literature. We completely characterize the invariant distribution of such processes and show how to calculate stochastically stable states by means of a treecharacterization algorithm. Moreover, specializing the process a bit further allows us to completely characterize the generated random graph ensemble. This new result demonstrates a new and rather general relation between random graph theory and evolutionary models with endogenous interaction structures.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://homepage.univie.ac.at/Papers.Econ/RePEc/vie/viennp/vie1001.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Vienna, Department of Economics in its series Vienna Economics Papers with number 1001.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Feb 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:vie:viennp:1001

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.univie.ac.at/vwl

Related research

Keywords:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January.
  2. Blume, Lawrence E., 2003. "How noise matters," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 251-271, August.
  3. Mathias Staudigl, 2013. "Co-evolutionary dynamics and Bayesian interaction games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 179-210, February.
  4. Matthew O. Jackson & Alison Watts, 2000. "On the Formation of Interaction Networks in Social Coordination Games," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0778, Econometric Society.
  5. Staudigl, Mathias, 2011. "Potential games in volatile environments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 271-287, May.
  6. Goyal, Sanjeev & Vega-Redondo, Fernando, 2005. "Network formation and social coordination," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 178-207, February.
  7. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
  8. Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinsky, 1995. "A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks," Discussion Papers 1098R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  9. George Ehrhardt & Matteo Marsili & Fernando Vega-Redondo, 2008. "Networks Emerging in a Volatile World," Economics Working Papers ECO2008/08, European University Institute.
  10. Hojman, Daniel A. & Szeidl, Adam, 2006. "Endogenous networks, social games, and evolution," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 112-130, April.
  11. Alan Beggs, 2003. "Waiting Times and Equilibrium Selection," Economics Series Working Papers 142, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  12. J Bergin & B L Lipman, 1997. "Evolution with state-dependent Mutations," Levine's Working Paper Archive 771, David K. Levine.
  13. Binmore, K. & Samuelson, L., 1997. "Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection," Working papers 9729r, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  14. Binmore, Ken & Samuelson, Larry, 1999. "Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(2), pages 363-93, April.
  15. George Ehrhardt & Matteo Marsili & Fernando Vega-Redondo, 2006. "Diffusion and growth in an evolving network," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 383-397, October.
  16. Blume Lawrence E., 1993. "The Statistical Mechanics of Strategic Interaction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 387-424, July.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Staudigl, Mathias, 2011. "Potential games in volatile environments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 271-287, May.
  2. Mathias Staudigl, 2013. "Co-evolutionary dynamics and Bayesian interaction games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 179-210, February.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:vie:viennp:1001. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Paper Administrator).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.