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The Emergent Seed: A Representation Theorem for Models of Stochastic Evolution and two formulas for Waiting Time

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  • Kevin Hasker
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    Paper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 786969000000000954.

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    Date of creation: 24 Apr 2014
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    Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000954

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