When Does One Bad Apple Spoil the Barrel? An Evolutionary Analysis of Collective Action
AbstractThis paper studies n-player collective-action games in which a public good is produced if and only if m or more volunteers contribute to it. Quantal-response strategy revisions allow play to move between equilibria in which a team of m players successfully provide, and an equilibrium in which the collective action fails. A full characterisation of long-run play reveals the determinants of success. These include the correlation between players` costs of provision and their valuations for the good. The addition of an extra bad apple player can spoil the barrel by destabilising successful teams. A contemporary application is the team-based provision of open-source software. The analysis reveals the features of successful open-source projects, and suggests a rationale for limiting the pool of possible contributors.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 269.
Date of creation: 01 Jun 2006
Date of revision:
Collective Action; Evolution; Teams; Equilibrium Selection; Concordance; Open-Source Software;
Other versions of this item:
- David P. Myatt & Chris Wallace, 2008. "When Does One Bad Apple Spoil the Barrel? An Evolutionary Analysis of Collective Action," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 75(2), pages 499-527.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-09-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-EVO-2006-09-23 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-KNM-2006-09-23 (Knowledge Management & Knowledge Economy)
- NEP-PBE-2006-09-23 (Public Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2006-09-23 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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- David P. Myatt & Chris Wallace, 2006.
"An Evolutionary Analysis of the Volunteer`s Dilemma,"
Economics Series Working Papers
270, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Myatt, David P. & Wallace, Chris, 2008. "An evolutionary analysis of the volunteer's dilemma," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 67-76, January.
- Jens Josephson & Karl Wärneryd, 2004.
"Long-Run Selection and the Work Ethic,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
1319, CESifo Group Munich.
- Aggarwal, Ishani & Woolley, Anita Williams, 2013. "Do you see what I see? The effect of members’ cognitive styles on team processes and errors in task execution," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 122(1), pages 92-99.
- Maruta, Toshimasa & Okada, Akira, 2014. "The Formation and Long-run Stability of Cooperative Groups in a Social Dilemma Situation," Discussion Papers 2014-03, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
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