Extreme Voting Under Proportional Representation:The Multidimensional Case
AbstractWe study the strategic behavior of voters in a model of proportional representation, in which the policy space is multidimensional. Our main finding is that in large electorate, under some assumptions on voters' preferences, voters essentially vote, in any equilibrium, only for the extreme parties.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía in its series Economics Working Papers with number we053421.
Date of creation: May 2005
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Francesco Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2008. "Extreme voting under proportional representation: the multidimensional case," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 30(3), pages 401-417, April.
- De Sinopoli, F. & Iannantuoni, G., 2005. "Extreme Voting under Proportional Representation: The Multidimensional Case," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge 0531, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-05-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2005-05-23 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-DCM-2005-05-23 (Discrete Choice Models)
- NEP-POL-2005-05-23 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni & Elena Manzoni, 2013. "Voting for Legislators," Working Papers, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics 240, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2013.
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