Voting for Legislators
AbstractIn this paper we propose a model with uncertainty in which strategic voters vote, under poportional rule, for a Parliament and parties bargain to form a government. We prove that only consensus government form and only extreme parties take votes.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 240.
Date of creation: Mar 2013
Date of revision: Mar 2013
Proportional Election; Strategic Voting; Legislative Bargaining;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-03-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2013-03-23 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2013-03-23 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2013-03-23 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-POL-2013-03-23 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- DE SINOPOLI, Francesco & IANNANTUONI, Giovanna, 2000.
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CORE Discussion Papers
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- De Sinopoli, F. & Iannantuoni, G., 2005.
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Cambridge Working Papers in Economics
0531, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Francesco Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2008. "Extreme voting under proportional representation: the multidimensional case," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 30(3), pages 401-417, April.
- Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2005. "Extreme Voting Under Proportional Representation:The Multidimensional Case," Economics Working Papers we053421, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
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