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To vote or to abstain? An experimental study or first past the poste and PR elections

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Author Info

  • André Blais

    (UdeM - Université de Montréal - Université de Montréal)

  • Jean-Benoît Pilet

    (Université Libre de Bruxelles - Département de Science Politique)

  • Karine Van Der Straeten

    (CNRS, Toulouse School of Economics - [-])

  • Jean-François Laslier

    (Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique - CNRS : UMR7176 - Polytechnique - X)

  • Maxime Heroux-Legault

    (Université de Montréal - [-])

Abstract

We examine through an experimental design how rational and non-rational considerations affect the decision to vote or to abstain in First Past the Post and PR elections. We show that in both types of elections, but particularly so under PR, a majority of subjects do not make the "right" decision, that is, they do not choose the option that is the most beneficial to them, given. We also demonstrate that a social norm such as sense of civic duty plays a bigger role, even in the lab, and particularly so in PR elections. We suggest that civic duty has a greater impact under PR because this electoral system has a more complicated formula, making it more difficult for voters to realize that their vote is unlikely to substantially affect the outcome of the election.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number hal-00616823.

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Date of creation: 24 Aug 2011
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Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00616823

Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00616823/en/
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Related research

Keywords: Experiments; Voting; First Past the Post; Proportional Representation; Civic Duty;

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

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  1. Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2003. "A Spatial Voting Model Where Proportional Rule Leads to Two-Party Equilibria," CEIS Research Paper 31, Tor Vergata University, CEIS.
  2. Arthur Schram & John Sonnemans, 2001. "Voter Turnout as a Participation Game: An Experimental Investigation," Levine's Working Paper Archive 563824000000000033, David K. Levine.
  3. Markus Mobius & Raphael Schoenle, 2006. "The Evolution of Work," NBER Working Papers 12694, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. De Sinopoli, Francesco & Ferraris, Leo & Iannantuoni, Giovanna, 2011. "The effect of ideology on policy outcomes in proportional representation systems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 87-90, September.
  5. Leslie Seidle & David Miller, 1976. "Turnout, rational abstention and campaign effort," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 121-126, September.
  6. Schram, Arthur & Sonnemans, Joep, 1996. "Why people vote: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 417-442, August.
  7. John Duffy & Margit Tavits, 2006. "Beliefs and Voting Decisions: A Test of the Pivotal Voter Model," Working Papers 273, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised May 2007.
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