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Experimental evidence that quorum rules discourage turnout and promote election boycotts

Author

Listed:
  • Luís Francisco Aguiar-Conraria

    (Universidade do Minho - NIPE)

  • Pedro C. Magalhães

    (University of Lisbon, Social Sciences Institute)

  • Christoph A. Vanberg

    (Alfred-Weber-Institut, University of Heidelberg)

Abstract

In most instances of collective decision-making, it cannot be expected that all persons who are entitled to vote will end up doing so. This has led institutional designers, out of concerns with the “legitimacy” of decisions, to introduce quorum requirements. A prominent example of this can be found in the context of direct democracy mechanisms, such as referenda and initiatives. We discuss the results of an experiment about the consequences of such quora. We show that quora lead to overall decreases in participation rates, dramatically increasing the likelihood of full-fledged electoral boycotts on the part of status quo supporters.

Suggested Citation

  • Luís Francisco Aguiar-Conraria & Pedro C. Magalhães & Christoph A. Vanberg, 2013. "Experimental evidence that quorum rules discourage turnout and promote election boycotts," NIPE Working Papers 14/2013, NIPE - Universidade do Minho.
    • Handle: RePEc:nip:nipewp:14/2013
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Yoichi Hizen, 2021. "A Referendum Experiment with Participation Quorums," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 74(1), pages 19-47, February.
    2. Matveenko, Andrei & Valei, Azamat & Vorobyev, Dmitriy, 2022. "Participation quorum when voting is costly," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    3. Karel Kouba & Michael Haman, 2021. "When do voters boycott elections with participation quorums?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 189(1), pages 279-300, October.
    4. Luís Aguiar-Conraria & Pedro C. Magalhães & Christoph A. Vanberg, 2020. "What are the best quorum rules? A laboratory investigation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 185(1), pages 215-231, October.
    5. Grüner Sven, 2020. "Sample Size Calculation in Economic Experiments," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 240(6), pages 791-823, December.
    6. Dmitriy Vorobyev & Azamat Valei & Andrei Matveenko, 2023. "Approval vs. Participation Quorums," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2023_438, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact

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