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Non-consequentialist voting

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  • Shayo, Moses
  • Harel, Alon
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    Abstract

    Standard theory assumes that voters’ preferences over actions (voting) are induced by their preferences over electoral outcomes (policies, candidates). But voters may also have non-consequentialist (NC) motivations: they may care about how they vote even if it does not affect the outcome. When the likelihood of being pivotal is small, NC motivations can dominate voting behavior. To examine the prevalence of NC motivations, we design an experiment that exogenously varies the probability of being pivotal yet holds constant other features of the decision environment. We find a significant effect, consistent with at least 12.5 percent of subjects being motivated by NC concerns.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.

    Volume (Year): 81 (2012)
    Issue (Month): 1 ()
    Pages: 299-313

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:81:y:2012:i:1:p:299-313

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo

    Related research

    Keywords: Expressive voting; Social preferences; Extended preferences; Elections; Democracy;

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    References

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    Citations

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    Cited by:
    1. Ivo Bischoff & Henrik Egbert, 2010. "Social information and bandwagon behaviour in voting: an economic experiment," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201005, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    2. Dahm, Matthias & Glazer, Amihai,, 2013. "A Carrot and Stick Approach to Agenda-Setting," Working Papers 2072/222199, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    3. Matthias Dahm & Amihai Glazer, 2012. "How An Agenda Setter Induces Legislators to Adopt Policies They Oppose," Working Papers 111211, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
    4. Vadim Cherepanov & Tim Feddersen & Alvaro Sandroni, 2013. "Revealed preferences and aspirations in warm glow theory," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 54(3), pages 501-535, November.
    5. Ivo Bischoff & Carolin Neuhaus & Peter Trautner & Bernd Weber, 2012. "The Neuroeconomics of Voting: Neural Evidence of Different Sources of Utility in Voting," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201234, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    6. Höchtl, Wolfgang & Sausgruber, Rupert & Tyran, Jean-Robert, 2012. "Inequality aversion and voting on redistribution," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(7), pages 1406-1421.
    7. Fabian Paetzel & Rupert Sausgruber & Stefan Traub, 2014. "Social Preferences and Voting on Reform: An Experimental Study," Department of Economics Working Papers wuwp172, Vienna University of Economics, Department of Economics.
    8. Schnellenbach, Jan & Schubert, Christian, 2014. "Behavioral public choice: A survey," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 14/03, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
    9. Ivo Bischoff & Thomas Krauskopf, 2013. "Motives of pro-social behavior in individual versus collective decisions – a comparative experimental study," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201319, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).

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