Undominated (and) perfect equilibria in Poisson games
AbstractIn games with population uncertainty some perfect equilibria are in dominated strategies. We prove that every Poisson game has at least one perfect equilibrium in undominated strategies.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.
Volume (Year): 66 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 (July)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836
Poisson games Undominated equilibria Perfect equilibria;
Other versions of this item:
- Francesco De Sionopoli & Carlos Gonzalez Pimienta, 2007. "Undominated (and) perfect equilibria in Poisson games," Economics Working Papers we073117, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
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