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Undominated (and) perfect equilibria in Poisson games

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  • De Sinopoli, Francesco
  • Pimienta, Carlos

Abstract

In games with population uncertainty some perfect equilibria are in dominated strategies. We prove that every Poisson game has at least one perfect equilibrium in undominated strategies.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 66 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 (July)
Pages: 775-784

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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:66:y:2009:i:2:p:775-784

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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Keywords: Poisson games Undominated equilibria Perfect equilibria;

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References

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  1. Roger B. Myerson, 1997. "Large Poisson Games," Discussion Papers 1189, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  2. Roger B. Myerson, 1994. "Population Uncertainty and Poisson Games," Discussion Papers 1102, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  3. Makris, Miltiadis, 2008. "Complementarities and macroeconomics: Poisson games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 180-189, January.
  4. MERTENS, Jean-François, . "Ordinality in non cooperative games," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1738, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  5. Roger B. Myerson, 2000. "Comparison of Scoring Rules in Poisson Voting Games," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0686, Econometric Society.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Francesco De Sinopoli & Claudia Meroni & Carlos Pimienta, 2014. "Strategic Stability in Poisson Games," Discussion Papers 2014-09, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
  2. Matías Núñez, 2014. "The strategic sincerity of Approval voting," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 56(1), pages 157-189, May.
  3. Bouton, Laurent & Gratton, Gabriele, 0. "Majority runoff elections: strategic voting and Duverger's hypothesis," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
  4. Matias Nunez, 2013. "The Strategic Sincerity of Approval Voting," Post-Print hal-00917101, HAL.

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