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Complementarities and Macroeconomics: Poisson Games

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  • Miltiadis Makris

    (Department of Economics, University of Exeter, CMPO, University of Bristol and IMOP, Athens University of Economics and Business)

Abstract

In many situations in macroeconomics strategic complementarities arise, and agents face a coordination problem. An important issue, from both a theoretical and a policy perspective, is equilibrium uniqueness. We contribute to this literature by focusing on the macroeconomic aspect of the problem: the number of potential innovators, speculators e.t.c. is large. In particular, we follow Myerson (1998, 2000) that in large games “a more realistic model should admit some uncertainty about the number of players in the game”. In more detail, we model the coordination problem as a Poisson game, and investigate the conditions under which unique equilibrium selection is obtained.

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File URL: http://people.exeter.ac.uk/cc371/RePEc/dpapers/DP0602.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Exeter University, Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 0602.

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Date of creation: Jan 2006
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Handle: RePEc:exe:wpaper:0602

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Related research

Keywords: Strategic Complementarities; Coordination Games; Poisson Games; Currency Crises; Innovation.;

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References

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  1. Roger B. Myerson, 1997. "Large Poisson Games," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1189, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  2. Carlsson, H. & Damme, E.E.C. van, 1993. "Global games and equilibrium selection," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-154416, Tilburg University.
  3. Stephen Morris & Hyun S Shin, 2001. "Global Games: Theory and Applications," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000001080, David K. Levine.
  4. Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjostrom, 2001. "Arms Races and Negotiations," Economics Working Papers, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science 0007, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
  5. In-Ho Lee & Robin Mason, 2002. "Coordination in the static and the dynamic," Levine's Working Paper Archive 391749000000000503, David K. Levine.
  6. Morris, Stephen & Shin, Hyun Song, 1998. "Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 587-97, June.
  7. Roger B. Myerson, 1994. "Population Uncertainty and Poisson Games," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1102R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  8. Burdzy, Krzysztof & Frankel, David M & Pauzner, Ady, 2001. "Fast Equilibrium Selection by Rational Players Living in a Changing World," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 69(1), pages 163-89, January.
  9. Mason, Robin & Valentinyi, Akos, 2003. "Independence and heterogeneity in games of incomplete information," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 0307, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
  10. Herrendorf, Berthold & Valentinyi, Akos & Waldmann, Robert, 2000. "Ruling Out Multiplicity and Indeterminacy: The Role of Heterogeneity," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(2), pages 295-307, April.
  11. Frankel, David M. & Pauzner, Ady, 2000. "Resolving Indeterminacy in Dynamic Settings: The Role of Shocks," Staff General Research Papers 11924, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
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Cited by:
  1. Francesco De Sinopoli & Claudia Meroni & Carlos Pimienta, 2014. "Strategic Stability in Poisson Games," Discussion Papers, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales 2014-09, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
  2. De Sinopoli, Francesco & Pimienta, Carlos, 2009. "Undominated (and) perfect equilibria in Poisson games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 775-784, July.
  3. Makris, Miltiadis, 2009. "Private provision of discrete public goods," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 292-299, September.
  4. Ioannou, Christos A. & Makris, Miltiadis, 2014. "An Experimental Study Of Uncertainty In Coordination Games," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 1401, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.

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