Ordinality in non cooperative games
AbstractWe first analyse what a conceptual definition of ordinality for non cooperative games should be. The resulting concept is highly abstract and apparently unmanageable. Nevertheless we obtain in a second part a very simple and fully operational characterization. In the last part, this is used to check the ordinality of a number of concepts that have been proposed in the literature. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2004
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 1987028.
Date of creation: 01 Jan 1987
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