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Ordinality in non cooperative games

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  • Jean-François Mertens

Abstract

We first analyse what a conceptual definition of ordinality for non cooperative games should be. The resulting concept is highly abstract and apparently unmanageable. Nevertheless we obtain in a second part a very simple and fully operational characterization. In the last part, this is used to check the ordinality of a number of concepts that have been proposed in the literature. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2004

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s001820400166
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Games Theory.

Volume (Year): 32 (2004)
Issue (Month): 3 (06)
Pages: 387-430

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Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:32:y:2004:i:3:p:387-430

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Cited by:
  1. Carlsson, H. & Van Damme, E., 1989. "Global Payoff Uncertainty And Risk Dominance," Papers 8933, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  2. Morris, Stephen & Ui, Takashi, 2004. "Best response equivalence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 260-287, November.
  3. Jacques Durieu & Hans Haller & Nicolas Quérou & Philippe Solal, 2007. "Ordinal Games," Post-Print ujm-00194794, HAL.
  4. Fabrizio Germano, 2006. "On some geometry and equivalence classes of normal form games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 34(4), pages 561-581, November.
  5. Amanda Friedenberg, 2006. "Can Hidden Variables Explain Correlation? (joint with Adam Brandenburger)," Theory workshop papers 815595000000000005, UCLA Department of Economics.
  6. Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert B., 2007. "Stable Outcomes of Generic Games in Extensive Form," Research Papers 1933r, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  7. De Sinopoli, Francesco & Pimienta, Carlos, 2009. "Undominated (and) perfect equilibria in Poisson games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 775-784, July.
  8. Vermeulen,Dries & Jansen,Mathijs, 1997. "The reduced form of a game," Research Memorandum 001, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  9. Balkenborg, Dieter & Jansen, Mathijs & Vermeulen, Dries, 2001. "Invariance properties of persistent equilibria and related solution concepts," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 111-130, January.
  10. GERMANO, Fabrizio, 1998. "On Nash equivalence classes of generic normal form games," CORE Discussion Papers 1998033, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  11. John Hillas & Elon Kohlberg, 1996. "Foundations of Strategic Equilibrium," Game Theory and Information 9606002, EconWPA, revised 18 Sep 1996.

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