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Ordinality in non cooperative games

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Author Info
Jean-François Mertens

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Abstract

We first analyse what a conceptual definition of ordinality for non cooperative games should be. The resulting concept is highly abstract and apparently unmanageable. Nevertheless we obtain in a second part a very simple and fully operational characterization. In the last part, this is used to check the ordinality of a number of concepts that have been proposed in the literature. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2004

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s001820400166
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Games Theory.

Volume (Year): 32 (2004)
Issue (Month): 3 (06)
Pages: 387-430
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Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:32:y:2004:i:3:p:387-430

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  1. John Hillas & Elon Kohlberg, 1996. "Foundations of Strategic Equilibrium," Game Theory and Information 9606002, EconWPA, revised 18 Sep 1996. [Downloadable!]
  2. Fabrizio Germano, 2006. "On some geometry and equivalence classes of normal form games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 34(4), pages 561-581, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Amanda Friedenberg, 2006. "Can Hidden Variables Explain Correlation? (joint with Adam Brandenburger)," Theory workshop papers 815595000000000005, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Vermeulen,Dries & Jansen,Mathijs, 1997. "The reduced form of a game," Research Memoranda 001, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  5. Jacques Durieu & Hans Haller & Nicolas Querou & Philippe Solal, 2007. "Ordinal Games," Economics working paper series 07/74, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich. [Downloadable!]
  6. Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert B., 2007. "Stable Outcomes of Generic Games in Extensive Form," Research Papers 1933r, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business. [Downloadable!]
  7. Morris, Stephen Morris & Takashi Ui, 2002. "Best Response Equivalence," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1377, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
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